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HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Rebecca M. Bratspies*
We can't manage effectively without trust1

Because environmental regulators exercise vast discretion against a background of scientific
uncertainty, the background assumptions they use to guide their decisionmaking are particularly
influential. This article suggests that were federal regulators to view themselves as human rights
decisionmakers, we might well see a new kind of regulatory decisionmaking emerge—one not only more
responsive and transparent but also more likely to enjoy the trust of the American public. Drawing from
the BP Oil Spill and the United States regulatory response to climate change this article shows how human
rights norms might enrich domestic regulatory processes and help environmental regulators implement
their statutory mission of protecting the public welfare. It demonstrates how interpreting domestic legal
obligations through the lens of human rights would enhance a commitment to participation, fairness and
accountability, thereby making the domestic regulatory process not only better and fairer, but also more
likely to be perceived as legitimate by the general public. The article concludes by pointing out some key
obstacles the human rights approach for achieving environmental ends.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has a regulatory system in dire need of reform. Beset by failures
like oil well blowouts,2 coal mine explosions,3 food and medical safety fiascos,4
imploding financial markets,5 and the bungled response to Hurricane Katrina,6 the federal
regulatory apparatus has foundered; indeed some call it broken.7 Blatant manipulation of
the science behind climate change and other policy creates a sense that regulation is just a
political game.8 As a result, the regulatory state has lost the trust of the American people.
Indeed, in April 2010, the Pew Research Center reported that only 22% of Americans
2

The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Oil Spill issued its final report in January 2011. The
report can be found at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/ Many of the key documents associated with the
BP oil spill can be found on the Deepwater Horizon Unified Command website at
http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/go/site/2931/. For a report detailing the regulatory failure
aspects of the disaster, see Alyson Flournoy, et al., Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made
the BP Blowout Possible and How the System Can Be Fixed to Avoid a Recurrence (Oct. 2010)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfm?RequestTimeout=50000000.
3
See Howard Berkes, FBI Probes Massey Energy, Regulators in Mine Blast, NPR (April 30, 2010)
http://www.scpr.org/news/2010/04/30/fbi-probes-massey-energy-regulators-in-mine-blast/; See e.g., Ian
Urbina and Michael Cooper Deaths at West Virginia Mine Raise Issues About Safety, NEW YORK TIMES
(April 6, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/us/07westvirginia.html;.
4

For example, in its reporting about the tainted cough syrup that killed hundreds in Panama, the New York Times
described ―a tainted pipeline stretching half-way around the world.‖ Walt Bogdanich and Jake Hooker, From China to
Panama, a Trail of Poisoned Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2007) (tracing the diethylene glycol tainted syrup from
China, through Europe to Panama.)
5

See e.g., David Leonhart, Lessons from a Crisis: When Trust Vanishes, Worry, NEW YORK TIMES
(Sept. 30 2008); Sarah Knapton, Financial Crisis: Home Safe Sales Soar as Trust in Banks Collapses, THE
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 10, 2008); Theresa Tedesco, Trust in Short Supply During Financial Crisis, FINANCIAL
POST (Sept. 17, 2008).
6
Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster of immense proportions but the failures to anticipate, prepare
for, and respond to the hurricane were regulatory failures. From certifying inadequate levies, to permitting
wholesale destruction of wetlands to shortchanging emergency response planning, all of the regulatory
agencies tasked with protecting New Orleans did not live up to their statutory obligations. For a collection
of various writings making this point, see Center for Progressive Reform, Katrina: An Unnatural Disaster
Years in the Making, http://www.progressivereform.org/katrina.cfm.
7
For a full development of this argument, see generally RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE
PEOPLES AGENT AND THE BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTEREST, GOVERNMENT
AND THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2010)
8
MARK BOWEN, CENSORING SCIENCE: INSIDE THE POLITICAL ATTACK ON DR. JAMES HANSEN AND THE
TRUTH OF GLOBAL WARMING (2007); For a thorough exploration of this problem, see RESCUING SCIENCE
FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 24–45, 61–85 (Rena Steinzor
& Wendy Wagner, eds. 2007)(documenting the ways that interest groups distort science to support political
positions.); see also CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 102–20 (2006). Allegations
swirled for years that political appointees in the Bush administration heavily edited scientific testimony and
government publications concerning climate change. In 2007, a House Committee Investigation concluded
that the administration systematically manipulated climate change science to minimize the dangers of
global warming. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Political Interference with Climate
Change Science Under the Bush Administration 16–32 (December 2007), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071210101633.pdf. Among the study‘s conclusions, political
appointees edited agency reports ―to exaggerate or emphasize scientific uncertainties or to deemphasize or
diminish the importance of the human role in global warming.‖ Id. at ii. In his inaugural address, President
Obama promised to ―restore science to its rightful place.‖
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090120/ap_on_go_pr_wh/inauguration_obama_text.
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trust the federal government all or most of the time – among the lowest levels in the past
fifty years. 9 Rebuilding that trust will require a significant governmental commitment to
transforming ―business as usual‖ and to renewing the link between regulation and the
public purposes regulation is intended to serve.
One way we might begin is by transforming the regulatory perspective—those
background assumptions that regulators use to guide their decisionmaking. These
assumptions play a particularly important role in contexts like environmental regulation,
where discretion is vast and scientific certainties are few.10 Were federal regulators to
embrace human rights norms, and view themselves as making decisions with human
rights ramifications, we might well see a new kind of regulatory decisionmaking
emerge—one more likely to garner the trust of a suspicious and distrusting public. This
article makes the case for such a transformation, arguing that regulators should draw on
human rights norms to help them grapple more effectively with issues of fairness and
transparency.11 Indeed, embrace of emerging human rights norms around participation,
access to information, transparency, and intergenerational equity, can help regulators
exercise their discretion in a fashion that not only supports rather than undermines
regulatory legitimacy, but also leads to better, more sustainable decisionmaking.
This observation remains true despite intense disagreement about whether
emerging international norms have coalesced into a free-standing environmental right
cognizable under international human rights law.12 The very characteristics that are
advanced as undermining the validity of the claim to a free-standing human right to a
wholesome environment actually offer support for the notion of incorporating human
9

See Pew Research Center, Distrust, Discontent, Anger Partisan Rancor: the People and their
Government (March 2010) http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1569/trust-in-government-distrust-discontentanger-partisan-rancor (hereafter Pew Report); Liz Halloran, Pew Poll: Trust in Government Hits Near
Historic Lows NPR (April 18, 2010) http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126047343.
While anti-government rhetoric surrounding the health care debate is likely to blame for some of the
decrease, it is clear that there are serious trust problems that extend beyond the Tea Party fringe. For
example, trust in EPA and FDA decreased by 15% and 17% respectively over the past decade, though both
agencies still held the trust of a slight majority of the American public. Seventy-four percent thought the
federal government did a fair or poor job of running its programs.
10
For recognition of this point in the context of the Clean Air Act, see Lead Industries Ass‘n, Inc. v.
EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1147 (D. C. Cir. 1980) (noting the wide policy discretion agencies have when making
decisions ―at the frontiers of science.‖)
11
For a detailed analysis of these stages of the regulatory process, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan
Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions in the Shadow of the State, in THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, eds. 2009). While human rights
norms might be of value to regulators across all aspects of regulation: from agenda-setting through
negotiation and implementation to enforcement, this project focuses on the more general question of
whether international human rights norms are an appropriate source for regulators to draw on in order to
improve domestic environmental regulatory process, leaving for later work the specifics of how human
rights might be used to transform each specific stage of the regulatory process.
12
See e.g., RICHARD P. HISKES, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A GREEN FUTURE: ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 36-47 (2010)(summarizing the philosophical debate); Gunther Handl,
Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly Revisionist View 117, 121 in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (A. Cançado Trindade ed.) (1992) (cautioning against misrepresenting
aspirational environmental human rights concepts as hard law, and recommending avoiding ―talismanic
invocations of non-binding resolutions‖ and other forms of soft law).
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rights norms into the domestic regulatory decisionmaking process. If environmental
decisions are in fact a constant trade-off between competing priorities, regulators need
guideposts for exercising their discretion as they make decisions about these trade-offs.
Emerging international norms associated with the putative right to a healthy environment
focus on facilitating participation and providing meaningful information. Embracing
these norms will help regulators keep the big picture in mind and might provide a
welcome counterweight to deregulatory pressures stemming from free-market ideology.
As such, incorporating these international human rights norms into the fabric of
discretionary decisionmaking can help regulators resist the pressures of momentary
expediency, by putting a thumb on the scale for overall system legitimacy and integrity.
Using human rights norms in this fashion begins with recognizing regulators as
potential human rights decisionmakers. Once regulators view themselves in this light, the
potential utility of international human rights discourse in domestic regulatory processes
becomes clear. Lessons gleaned from the field of human rights can enrich domestic
regulation by making the decisionmaking process more responsive, more transparent, and
ultimately more likely to enjoy the trust of the American public. This argument is both
prudential and normative—making the case that resort to environmental human rights
norms is a good idea because these concepts can help regulators implement their statutory
mission of protecting the public welfare. In short, this article advocates a form of
regulatory borrowing.13
Part I begins with a description of the regulatory enterprise—highlighting the need to
make regulatory decisions under conditions of uncertainty and despite critical knowledge
gaps. This section suggests that it is these aspects of regulatory decisionmaking that
make it ripe for lessons from human rights. Part II offers a brief overview of
international human rights law, and then provides an introduction to the emerging norms
often associated with a putative human right to a healthy environment. Part III introduces
the domestic environmental law questions that would most benefit if regulators borrowed
from human rights. This section highlights some key deficiencies in current practices that
borrowing from human rights might address. This section draws from the BP Oil Spill
and the United States regulatory response to climate change to show how domestic
regulatory processes might be enriched by international human rights norms. It
demonstrates how interpreting domestic legal obligations through the lens of human
rights would enhance a commitment to participation, fairness and accountability, thereby
making the domestic regulatory process not only better and fairer, but also more likely to
be perceived as legitimate by the general public. Finally, the article concludes by pointing
out some key limitations of the human rights approach for achieving environmental ends
and proposes some concrete steps to expand environmental rights beyond human rights.

13

For a discussion of borrowing in the constitutional context, see Nelson Tebbe & Richard Tsai,
Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459 2010 (defining constitutional borrowing as ―the practice
of importing doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one area of constitutional law into
another for persuasive ends.‖ I use the term borrowing in much the same way, but in the regulatory rather
than constitutional context.
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I. THE REGULATOR AS POTENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONMAKER
Federal agencies -make a wide range of discretionary decisions. For most of these
decisions, there will be virtually no oversight: no court, legislature or public-minded
group will challenge, or even closely examine, the agency‘s fidelity to its statutory
mandate and/or the public‘s interest. The Supreme Court‘s Chevron decision,14 whic
severely limiting judicial oversight, only magnified this already existing phenomenon.
Public Choice theory suggests that, under these circumstances, agencies will inevitably
become rent-seekers, rather than public watchdogs, enforcers or investigators.
Public choice scholars15 have given particular attention to regulation in the
environmental context. The public choice theory has at its heart the conviction that
legislation (and by corollary regulation) is a good to be sold in the marketplace to the
highest bidder.16 Thus, the public choice narrative posits that concentrated, economically
powerful industries with significant economic stakes in regulatory decisions will win out
against diffuse, public interests. Yet environmental law, which often benefits diffuse and
relatively non-economic public interests at the expense of concentrated economic
interests stands as something of a paradox for public choice theory. Responses to this
critique, ranging from the republican moment theory of legislation and regulation17 to
Habermasean deliberative democracy, reflect extremely varied first assumptions about
how and why human beings structure themselves into societies and groups. Regardless of
which camp one inhabits, it is clear that this theoretical dialogue taps into something
fundamental in environmental law—the multiple, often conflicting goals that surround
environmental choices, and the power inequality inherent to so many regulatory
dynamics between regulated communities and the public beneficiaries of environmental
regulation. Recognizing this essentially contested nature of environmental
decisionmaking, and the enormous power differentials between the subjects and
beneficiaries of regulation, also means acknowledging the high stakes that surround many
exercises of regulatory discretion. With the potentially immense social impacts flowing
from these discretionary decisions in plain view, the quest to embed exercises of
regulatory discretion within a value system takes on added urgency. Efficiency and
market rationality offer one such structure, while human rights provides an alternative
organizing principle, emphasizing a different set of social values. Indeed, human rights
might be a tool for channeling regulatory discretion toward paths more likely to
maximize overall social benefit, and away from paths giving undue weight to narrow,
albeit powerful, special interests.
The inquiry into the human rights agency of environmental regulators is of particular
14

Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 5-65 (1971)
16
For summaries of these public choice analyses, see STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND THE
PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 15, 19-21 (2008); Daniel A.
Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 61, 65 (1992). For a
thorough analysis of environmental federalism through a public choice lens, see Richard L Revesz,
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 636-41
(2001).
17
Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment- Explanations for
Environmental Laws, 1969-73 9 Duke Envt‘l L. & Pol‘y Forum 29 (1998).
15
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importance in the United States because the United States does not currently recognize
any constitutional environmental rights.18 Thus, any arguments for recognition and
implementation of substantive environmental rights must either derive those
environmental rights from statutory enactments, state constitutional rights to a healthy
environment,19 or existing federal constitutional rights.20
When legislating in the environmental area, Congress has been prone to grand
statements and sweeping language.21 Profound underlying questions about the relative
weight of competing priorities and the proper role for agencies vis-à-vis the public they
serve are typically left unanswered by broad-brush statutory enactments. Their resolution
is delegated to the discretion of regulatory agencies which are tasked with transforming
lofty legislative pronouncements into a functional regulatory program. In shaping the
contours of the regulatory scheme, agencies must balance competing objectives, make
choices about priorities, simplify and standardize, and generally exercise a great deal of
18

Often constitutionalization is interpreted to be a key signal that a state has accepted the validity of
human rights norms. The first meaningful attempt to enshrine environmental rights in the United States
constitution came in 1968 when Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson proposed a constitutional amendment
which read: ―Every person has the inalienable right to a decent environment. The United States and every
state shall guarantee this right.‖ Carole L. Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of
Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107, 120 citing H.R.J. Res. 1321,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). This and similar subsequent attempts to include environmental rights in the
United States constitution failed, though Senator Nelson‘s proposed amendment certainly did much to raise
awareness about then-looming environmental issues. Id. at 120, citing H.R.J. Res. 1205, 91st Cong. (1970)
19
For a description of constitutional environmental rights, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, On
Constitutionalizing Environmental Rights 209, 211-13, in LAW AND RIGHTS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GOVERNANCE (Penelope A. Andrews & Susan Bazilli, eds. 2008). While these
constitutional rights are important, by themselves they do not vitiate the need for a human rights approach
to environmental regulation. As is true with most constitutional environmental rights around the world
however, these state-guaranteed environmental rights are typically formulated in open-ended language,
seeking consensus on an abstraction without actually resolving the complicated moral and political
questions implicated by environmental rights. Some formulations are wholly aspirational, while others can
offer a normative hook for courts and regulators seeking to ‗green‘ interpretations of domestic law. See
e.g., Jona Razzaque, Human Rights and the Environment: the National Experience of South Asia and
Africa, Joint UNEP-OHCRC Expert Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment: Background Paper
No. 4, 14-16 (2002). See also Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment, 18
FORDHAM ENVT‘L L. REV. 471 (2007). While the same criticisms have been leveled at human rights, there
is a growing body of law and scholarship focused on pinning down the content of rights like participation,
transparency and equity. Given the overlap between constitutional environmental rights, statutory rights,
and human rights norms surrounding the environment, an appreciation for those human rights might help
law makers and regulators operationalize those constitutional and statutory environmental commitments.
See e.g., Hannah Hurst, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 Ga. J. Comp. & Int‘l L. 287 (1996)(providing a survey of the varying way that
national courts have deployed international human rights); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International
Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 82, 85 (2004) (making the point that human rights
call into question positive law that is insufficiently respectful of internationally-articulated values.)
20
Some argue that international law directly creates environmental rights that states are bound to
implement. In order to focus on the more modest claim that international human rights norms can usefully
inform regulators seeking to implement rights grounded elsewhere, this article brackets that argument.
21
For example, the Clean Water Act identified eliminating the discharge of pollutants into waters of
the United States as a goal to be met by 1985. Clean Water Act §101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. §1251. The National
Environmental Policy Act announces a national policy of using all practicable means ―to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,‖ NEPA § 101(a), 42.
U.S.C. § 4331(a).
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discretion. Unless this exercise of discretion runs counter to an explicit statutory
command or is otherwise arbitrary and capricious, courts are reluctant to interfere with
the balance that is struck.22 How agencies exercise their discretion is thus the single most
important factor in determining whether environmental statutes produce an equitable
distribution of environmental risks and benefits across society, and whether the statutes
succeed in achieving their environmental objectives. At the regulatory level,
decisionmakers are grappling with some of the precise moral and political questions that
international human rights law has developed to address.
Yet, human rights lawyers have so far rarely waded into these waters, instead
focusing their creative thinking about law and legal arguments on the context of
litigation, courts and judges. As a result we have seen human rights arguments
increasingly being used as new or supplemental rationales for judicial decisions.23 With
all due respect for that strategy, there are many other legal venues besides the courtroom
in which human rights ideas might make a difference. As Professors McDougal and
Lasswell memorably pointed out,24 there are other legal decisionmakers besides judges,
and other ways to influence authoritative decision besides litigation. 25 Their concept of
22

Saying this does not mean that courts fail to police the processes by which agencies strike that
balance. Under the ―hard look‖ doctrine, for example, courts carefully examine the rulemaking process to
ensure that proper procedures have been followed and that statutorily-mandated factors have been
considered. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
463 U.S. 27 (1983). However, outside of satisfying themselves that agencies have considered statutorilyidentified factors and employed appropriate procedures, judicial review of the actual regulatory choices
made through an exercise of regulatory discretion is extremely limited. See Administrative Procedures Act
§706.
23
For example, human rights arguments featured prominently in successful petitions to the Supreme
Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 573-78 (2003) (referencing decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights); Ropers v. Simons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (pointing out that the court‘s decision was
in line with the ―overwhelming weight‖ of ―virtually unanimous‖ international opinion); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (relying in part on European decisions to conclude that executing the
mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment). The failure of human rights arguments in Castlerock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) prompted a new lawsuit before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. Gonzales v. United States, All legal documents relating to this case can be found at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/human_rights/InterAmer/GonzalesvUS/CaseDocs. For a
discussion of the import of the Inter-American Commission‘s 2007 ruling that it had jurisdiction to hear the
case, see ACLU, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Holds US Responsible for Protecting
Domestic Violence Victims (Oct. 7, 2007) http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/inter-american-commissionhuman-rights-holds-us-responsible-protecting-domestic-violen. Nothing in this article is intended to
denigrate this use of international human rights principles. Instead, the argument is that there is much more
that might be done to use those principles to transform domestic law in the United States. For an excellent
exploration of the myriad ways that human rights might be used in the United States, see BRINGING HUMAN
RIGHTS HOME (Cindy Soohoo, Cathy Albisa & Martha F. Davis, eds. 2008).
24
See generally, HAROLD. D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY (1992) (exploring the question of authoritative decisionmaking in exhaustive, and sometimes
excruciating detail); see also Rebecca M. Bratspies, Rethinking Decisionmaking in International Law: A
Process-Oriented Approach to Sustainable Development, 32 YALE J. INT‘L L. 363, 370–77 (2007)
25
See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER ix (1960). Much of the
scholarship associated with the New Haven School that McDougal and Laswell founded has been criticized
as opaque and inpenetrable. See e.g., Rebecca Bratspies, Rethinking Decisionmaking in International Law:
A Process-Oriented Approach to Sustainable Development, 32 Yale J. Int‘l L. 363, 390 (2007); Spencer
Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 557, 564 (1994);Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal
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―authoritative decisionmaking,‖26 which Michael Reisman explained as a process of
communication involving "policy content, authority signal and control intention,‖27 offers
a more nuanced way to think about the relationship between law, policy and society.
For example, each day regulators make an uncounted number of discretionary
decisions with legal effect. Taken together, these decisions influence nearly every aspect
of our lives. Yet, there is rarely much attention paid to the possibility of considering these
regulatory decisionmaking processes as a means to advance core human rights values. .
This article proposes to change that by using international human rights norms to flesh
out the regulatory processes already present in United States administrative law, albeit in
nascent form, that locate human rights and human dignity squarely in the center of the
regulatory enterprise.
This point differs slightly from Ann-Marie Slaughter‘s insights about the roles played
by transnational networks.28 Rather than focusing on linkages between regulators across
jurisdictions that can be used to develop consensus approaches to regulation, this article
instead emphasizes the agency of regulators as authoritative human rights
decisionmakers. Thus, the focus is more on ―bringing human rights home‖29 than on
processes for voluntarily coordinating national environmental policies across the globe.
That said, the extensive transnational network discourse informs this analysis of how
regulators might fruitfully incorporate human rights into regulatory decisionmaking in
order to enrich and improve the domestic regulatory process. In particular, this analysis
seeks to remedy the human rights community‘s tendency to neglect the wider panoply of
legal decisionmakers as potentially receptive audiences with the power to implement
human rights norms in their decisionmaking processes. Human rights norms surrounding
access to information and participation might be particularly useful in this context.
Studies, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 811, 818-20 (1990); Oran R. Young, International Law and Social Science: The
Contributions of Myres S. McDougal, 66 Am. J. Int‘l. L. 60, 72-76 (1972); See also John N. Moore,
Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 Va. L. Rev. 662, 665
(1968); Richard A. Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law—Gaps in Legal
Thinking, 50 Va. L. Rev. 231, 234-35 (1964). Nevertheless, the core ideas of the ―authoritative
decisionmaker‖ with the power to advance ―human dignity‖ may be of value in any attempt to expand the
reach of human rights norms beyond the courtroom into administrative decisionmaking. See HAROLD D.
LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL
& W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF
THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1981); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
DIGNITY (1980); and Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law on National Law: A PolicyOriented Perspective, 4 S. D. L. REV. 25 (1959).
26
Authoritative decisionmaking is a central concept in New Haven School theories. It represents the
synthesis of effective control with a legitimated process comporting with the ―shared expectations of the
members of a community about how decisions should be taken.‖ Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell
& W. Michael Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8
VA. J. INT‘L L. 188, 195, n. 15 (1968).
27
W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L
L. PROC. 101, 113 (1981).
28
ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 167-69 (2004). See also Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International
Law, 43 Va. J. Int‘l L. (2002); David T. Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law (2008)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156930.
29
For an explanation of this idea, see generally, CATHY ALBISA, CINDY SOOHOO & MARTHA DAVIS,
BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME (2007).
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Learning from human rights developments in these areas might dramatically improve the
regulatory process, providing regulators with new tools for generating broad-based
participation. Having all the values and interests at stake in environmental protection
decisions adequately represented in the decisionmaking process will enhance the
legitimacy and long-term success of the regulatory project. In other words, human rights
norms might offer ―authoritative decisionmakers‖ a tool for re-interpreting their existing
environmental mandates in a fashion that will not only improve the regulatory decisions
themselves, but will also help those decisions command more trust and respect from the
regulated community and the public beneficiaries of regulation.
Having identified regulators as authoritative decisionmakers whose decisions have
potential human rights implications, we now now turn to international human rights law
in order to examine its utility within the domestic regulatory context. The next section
will first distinguish this proposed regulatory incorporation of human rights from existing
invocations of human rights law in the environmental context. It will then delve into the
specific aspects of international human rights law of most interest in the domestic
regulatory context.
II.

WHAT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CAN OFFER UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

To date, the primary avenue by which international environmental norms
emerging from human rights theory have entered the United States legal discourse has
been through Alien Tort Claims Act30 suits alleging that environmental wrongs violated
the law of nations. The thrust of the argument has therefore been focused on whether
there is a human right to a healthy environment. United States domestic courts have sofar resisted the invitation to find such a right, under either international human rights31 or
30

The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350, enacted in 1789, creates federal district court
jurisdiction over ―any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States.‖ The Act was largely dormant until the Second Circuit decided, in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1980), that because human rights were ―well-established, universally
recognized norms of international law,‖ id. at 888, that the Act provided access to United States courts for
victims to sue perpetrators of human rights abuses.
31
For example, not a single alien tort claims act case (ATCA) alleging violation of environmental
rights has been successful. The reasons rejecting for environmental ATCA claims or for refusing to even
reach those claims vary—but read as a group, these cases document an unwillingness of the courts to lead
in this context. See e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F. 3d. 233, 256-262 (2d Cir. 2003)
(affirming dismissal of ATCA environmental claim on the ground that the human rights to life, health and
sustainable development were not yet definite enough to be jus cogens norms); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221
F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (dismissing environmental alien tort claim suit on political question
doctrine grounds); Beanal v. Freeport-McMorran, Inc. 969 F. Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. La. 1997)(finding that
environmental tort allegations did not allege a violation of a ―universal, definable and obligatory‖
international norm); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that Principle 2
of the Rio Declaration might constitute a binding international environmental norm but dismissing the case
on forum non conveniens grounds); Amlon Metals v. FMC Corp. 775 F. Supp. 668. 671(1991)(finding that
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration did not constitute a binding international norm). But see, Oposa
v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, 804-805 (1993 (refusing to dismiss environmental claims under political
question doctrine and recognizing a justiciable ―right to a balanced and healthful ecology.‖) Séverine
Fiorletta Leroy, Can the Human Rights Bodies be Used to Produce Interim Measures to Protect
Environment-Related Human Rights? 15 RECIEL 66, (2006)(arguing that human rights bodies are an
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in domestic constitutional rights,32 often concluding instead that the legislative and
executive branches of government are better suited to establish environmental rights. A
primary objection to the notion of recognizing independent environmental human rights
is that ―the evolution of environmental protection measures has involved a constant
reordering of socio-economic priorities, of accommodating, adjusting or offsetting
mutually restrictive if not exclusive public policy objectives.‖33 Among the major
sticking points is the question of who would hold such a right34 and whether the right
would have to account for future generations and group rights.35 In an ever-more
integrated, globalized world, how would the right to a healthy environment be enforced
and would the right have any limits?36
These are certainly important and interesting questions. However, there are other
questions about these international law principles worth asking under United States
domestic law. For example, as EPA uses its authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions how should the agency confront questions of equity and

appropriate forum to protect human rights.)
32
Indeed, federal courts have repeatedly declined the invitation to interpret existing constitutional
language as including environmental rights. See e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1429 (9th
Cir.1989) (declining to find a fundamental constitutional right to a wholesome environment within the
equal protection clause of the 14th amendment); Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346
(D.C.Cir. 1981) (declaring that generalized environmental concerns do not constitute a constitutionally
protected liberty or property interest); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4 th Cir. 1971) (same). In the early
1970‘s, a string of district court cases fleshed out this position, most notably Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium
and Exposition District, 418 F.Supp. 716 (E.D.La.1976) (stating that the courts have never seriously
considered the right to a clean environment to be constitutionally protected under the 5 th and 14th
amendments); Haggadorn v. Union Carbide, 363 F.Supp. 1061 (D. W. Va., 1973); Tanner v. Armco Steel
Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D.Tex. 1972) ("The Ninth Amendment, through its 'penumbra' or
otherwise, embodies no legally assertable right to a healthful environment."); and Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Eng'rs of U.S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 738-39 (D.C. Ark. 1970) (holding that there is no
Constitutional right to a healthy environment under the 5th, 9th or 14th Amendments), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). For a discussion of these cases, see Carole L. Gallagher,
The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9
Fordham Envtl. L.J. 107, 112-17 (1997).
33
Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly Revisionist View 117,
121 in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (A. Cançado Trindade ed.) (1992)
34
It is possible to make too much of this claim. See John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights,
50 Va. J. Int‘l L. 163, 171 (2009)(making the point that many human rights agreements have been
interpreted to require that states not only avoid directly violating the rights involved but also protect the
enumerated rights from private conduct that interferes with their enjoyment.)
35
Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment, 18 FORDHAM ENVT‘L L. REV.
471 (2007) (raising these questions).
36
The recognition of a human right does not mean that any interference with that right by any actor,
anywhere in the world violates a legal duty. See Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 321 (2004); John Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT‘L L. 27-28
(2008). Indeed, the provision in Article 2 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights for ―progressive realization‖ is an acknowledgment that full realization of these rights sometimes
involves commitments beyond the immediate capacity of states. This critique about the contours of human
rights is separate and apart from the more fundamental objection that an overemphasis on rights may
actually interfere with social change by obscuring recognition of social duties and fragmenting
accountability. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF SOCIAL DISCOURSE
(1991).
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justice, and how should it account for transnational impacts of climate change—all
questions to which international human rights norms already speak.37
Unfortunately, discouraged by this ―no‖ to the question of whether there is an
already-recognized human right to a healthy environment, many human rights
campaigners abandon law in favor of the political process. Those still committed to law
as a vehicle for achieving human rights typically redouble their efforts with the courts.38
Yet, there is another, often-overlooked avenue to incorporating human rights into
domestic policy. Human rights norms can provide regulators with a normative framework
for structuring and interpreting their regulatory discretion.39 Because environmental
human rights norms typically prioritize transparency, responsiveness and accountability,
they can help regulators engage in environmental decisionmaking that enhances rather
than undermines public trust in environmental regulation.40 In many ways, the
international environmental human rights norms have developed in parallel to United
States domestic law, grappling with many of the same perplexing questions about how to
balance competing priorities, what to do about uncertainty, and what levels of
transparency and participation are critical for overall regime legitimacy and fundamental
fairness. Just as international law has been influenced by innovations in United States
law, regulatory interpretation of domestic law can be informed by concepts developed
internationally.
Under such an approach, each environmental decisionmaking point becomes an
opportunity for realizing a human rights vision under domestic law because each such
decision involves exercises of discretion by government actors. That regulatory discretion
would be shaped and channeled differently were it informed by a human rights vision of
environmental protection.
The rest of this section lays the groundwork for this claim about the utility of
human rights norms in domestic regulatory decisionmaking. The first part provides an
overview of the critical normative role human rights plays in international law and
society. With that background, the second part examines the history of environmental
37

Of course, there is also the question of whether an analytical framework that developed in response
to active and direct government abuses offers the right tools for responding to the ravages of climate
change, which is primarily the result of private economic activity. While government policies obviously
facilitate and channel the private economic activity through exercise of governmental licensing, taxation
and police powers, there is at least arguably a difference between these regulatory activities and the kinds
of direct government activities that human rights law has typically addressed.
38
Many of the instances in which there is the most pressure for invoking human rights discourse
involve the environmental rights of indigenous peoples. Given the tenuous historical relationship between
indigenous groups and international law, and the ambiguities of group rights as human rights, the Draft
Declaration on Indigenous Rights notwithstanding, it is difficult not to notice the irony of this use of human
rights principles.
39
Joseph Raz has persuasively argued that when we state that ‗X‘ has a right, we are asserting that ‗X‘
has interests which are sufficiently weighty to impose obligations on others. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM 166 (1986). Even without establishing specific environmental rights, domestic environmental
law clearly follows this Razian formula--imposing obligations in order to protect the weighty
environmental and health interests of both society as a whole, and of its individual members. This
parallelism between recognized interests and imposed obligations, suggests that the ideas and concepts
fleshed out in the human rights context about environmental decisionmaking may provide useful models
for fleshing out the contours of the obligations under domestic environmental law.
40
For a discussion of what it takes to establish ―regulatory trust‖, see Rebecca M. Bratspies,
Regulatory Trust, 51 ARIZONA L. REV. 575 (2009). .
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rights under international and supra-national law, focusing on the relationship between
environmental claims and human rights. Finally, the third part introduces three emerging
norms that are closely associated with human rights in the environmental context: prior
informed consent, transparency and participation. This section not only explains each
norm, but also highlights the aspects most likely to be of use to domestic regulators.
A. An Introduction to International Human Rights
The idea of human rights—inalienable, universal rights to which all are entitled
simply by virtue of being human41—stands out as a significant achievement of twentiethcentury legal thought. While the intellectual history behind human rights certainly traces
its roots back to the Enlightenment,42 the specific principles we think of as human rights
emerged from the more immediate and bloody context of Nazi genocide in the early
decades of the twentieth-century.43 Since the acceptance of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948,44 the concepts of human rights have increasingly been accepted
as the governing norms for state behavior.45 Unsurprisingly in light of its moment of
birth, the Universal Declaration responds to the central international legal challenge of
the twentieth century—the proper limits of state power vis-à-vis individuals who are
members of marginalized racial, ethnic or religious minorities. As such, international
human rights law deals mainly with how people should be treated by government and its
41

See e.g., ROSALYN HIGGENS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT
98 (1994)(―a human right is a right held vis-à-vis the state by virtue of being human‖). Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: ―All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another with
brotherhood.‖ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, at 74, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). For a
discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of universal human rights, see JACK DONNELLY, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 18-26 (1989).
42
For a discussion on this point, see Amy Sinden, Climate Change and Human Rights, 27 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 255, 260-62 (2007); RICHARD P. HISKES, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A GREEN FUTURE
26-30 (2009); TOM CAMPBELL, RIGHTS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 5-10 (2006).
43
See JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATION: A GREAT ADVENTURE
(1984)(describing World War II as a catalyst for human rights.) For a marvelous overview of the
significance of the Universal Declaration and its origins, see generally Louis B. Sohn, The New
International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AMERICAN U. L. REV. 1
(1982).
44
The vote in the United Nations was 48-0, with 8 abstentions. Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)
45
Indeed, compliance with human rights norms is often the major criteria for categorizing states as
―liberal‖ and therefore legitimate. See e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 84-104
(William Rehg, trans. 1998); THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990);
Ann-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur. J. Int‘l L. 139 (1995); see
also Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into
Domestic Practices 1, 18-22, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC
CHANGE (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink, eds 1999) (describing the embrace of
human rights as a global norm cascade). Although the delegates that adopted the Universal Declaration
were careful to state that it was a statement of principles rather than a binding treaty, Eleanor Roosevelt‘s
prediction that the Universal Declaration would become ―an international Magna Carta‖ was not far off.
See Eleanor Roosevelt, On the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 9, 1948)
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/eleanorrooseveltdeclarationhumanrights.htm.
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institutions.46 The International Human Rights Covenants47 and the proliferation of rights
treaties that followed48 further detail the scope and reach of human rights described in the
Universal Declaration.
Although we are only one decade into the new century, it is already clear that the
widespread adoption of international human rights treaties did not draw a line under
incidents violating basic human rights. Abuses continue, and neither the Universal
Declaration, nor the Genocide convention49 nor the International Criminal Court,50 have
put an end to them.51 Not only have human rights not eliminated rights-violating conduct
by states, but the growing proliferation of non-state actors raises a whole new set of
challenges that a state-based vision of human rights is hard pressed to address. Profound
questions remain about the utility of relying on international human rights to respond to
abuses committed by non-state actors, particularly multinational corporations.52
Even as old human rights problems linger, the new century (and millennium) brings
new challenges. In particular, environmental problems confront us ever more acutely.
Each day brings new evidence that human activity is dramatically and irreversibly
altering the entire planet: unraveling the life support systems on which we and all other
living creatures depend. The defining moral issue and social justice challenge of the
twenty-first century may well be the tragic effects of climate change, just as genocide and
the struggle against oppression of stigmatized groups was the defining challenge of the
46

See generally, Thomas Pogge, The International Significance of Human Rights," 4 J. OF ETHICS 45,
47 (2000) (noting that for human rights to be implicated, the offending conduct must be in some fashion
official);see also John H. Knox, Diagonal Environmental Rights 148, 148-150, in EXTRATERRITORIAL
OBLIGATIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2009)
47
ICCPR and ICESCR, supra note __.
48
See, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
44; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted March 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
49
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment on the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S
277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). For updates, see The Campaign to End Genocide,
http://www.genocidewatch.org/.
50
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999.
51
Though within the jurisdiction of the court, the ICC has yet to charge a defendant with genocide. See
Situations
and
Cases
before
the
ICC,
available
at:
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/. In 2008, the ICC Prosecutor requested a warrant for
arrest for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for atrocities in Darfur which included ten counts of
genocide, but the court declined to accept the prosecutor‘s request. As a result, the Prosecutor proceeded
with an arrest warrant based on crimes against humanity and war crimes. See Press Release: ICC
Prosecutor presents case against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad AL BASHIR, for genocide, crimes
against
humanity
and
war
crimes
in
Darfur
available
at:
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20%282008%29/a. While
limited prosecution for genocide has taken place in ad hoc tribunals, including the ICTR in Rwanda, as well
as the ICTY, it has been used in limited circumstances, and has not been attempted by the ICC. See
Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal Pronounces Guilty Verdict in Historic Genocide Trial, available
at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980902.afr94.html; See also ECHR Jorgic v. Germany
Judgment §47,112 (genocide judgment for the Srebenica massacre in Bosnia).
52
For a more detailed exploration of this point, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, Organs of Society: A Plea
for Human Rights Accountability for Transnational Enterprises and Other Commercial Entities, 13 MICH.
ST. J. INT‘L L. 9 (2005); see also John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights, 102 Am. J. Int‘l L. 1 (2008).
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twentieth century.
Amy Sinden has called human rights law ―the law‘s best response to profound,
unthinkable, far-reaching moral transgression.‖53 It should thus come as no surprise that
many are eager to invoke the ―law‘s best response‖ in response to climate change. And,
indeed there are invocations of international human rights norms throughout the climate
change discourse as legislators, regulators and advocates seek to deploy ―the power of
human rights‖54 in this new struggle.
B. Environmental Rights Under International Law
In making the argument that environmental regulators should rely on human rights to
inform their decisionmaking, it is important not to overstate the relationship between
human rights and environmental rights. Human rights and environmental protection trace
their origins back to very different legal traditions and sources. To over-generalize,
human rights are rooted in the natural law tradition in international law while
environmental law is the product of a much more state-centered positive law tradition.55
More significantly, environmental law does not have protecting human beings qua
individuals at its core in the same fashion that human rights law does. Indeed,
environmental law‘s most distinctive feature is that it responds to the ramifications of
human impacts on the natural environment.56 By contrast, even when invoked in the
environmental context, human rights focus on protecting the human victims of
environmental degradation57 rather than on protecting the environment itself.58 Human
rights are, after all inherently anthropocentric.59 This distinction helps explain why the
two legal discourses have evolved along very different tracks. That said, there are
obvious points of intersection and overlap between environmental rights and human
53

Amy Sinden, Climate Change and Human Rights, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVT‘L L. 255, 257
(2007).
54
See generally, THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE
(Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 1999).
55
One must be careful not to make too much of this distinction. As Gunther Handl notes, most
international lawyers agree that human rights law involves overlapping positive and natural law concepts.
Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly Revisionist View 117, 120 in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (A. Cançado Trindade ed.) (1992); See also Louis B.
Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32
AMERICAN U. L. REV. 1, 16-18 (1982).
56
For a rich exploration of this point, see Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental about
Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 703 (2000).
57
See e.g., Krytatos, 40 Eur. Ct. H. R. par. 52. (concluding that nothing in the European Convention on
Human Rights provided ―general protection of the environment as such.‖) ; Metropolitan Nature Reserve v.
Panama, Case 11.533, inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 88/03 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev par 34
(2003)(rejecting as inadmissible the attempt to assert a claim to protect a nature reserve from development
on behalf of all citizens of Panama).
58
NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES
277 (2004); Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly Revisionist View
117, 138-39 in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (A. Cançado Trindade ed.) (1992).
59
See Dinah Shelton, The Links Between International Human Rights Guarantees and Environmental
Protection 22 (University of Chicago, Center for International Studies, 2004), http://
internationalstudies.uchicago.edu/environmentalrights/shelton.pdf (pointing out that ―[h]uman rights are by
definition anthropocentric.‖)
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rights.60
The first formal international law recognition of the links between environmental
protection and human rights occurred in the Stockholm Declaration, adopted by the 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. Principle 1 of this Declaration
proclaims that:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity
and well-being, and he bears the solemn responsibility to protect and improve
the environment for present and future generations.61
The 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development62
(UNCED or the Rio Conference) focused global attention on environmental concerns and
more particularly on the unsustainable nature of human activities. More importantly, the
Rio Declaration marked a global recognition that human activity was undermining the
integrity of natural systems on which human life and society depend. Yet the Rio
Declaration did not, as some had hoped, announce a human right to a healthy
environment. In fact, considering the fact that such language had been proposed and
rejected from the Declaration, Rio may in fact represent a significant step away from
such a commitment. From Rio onward, an explosion of international treaty-making
produced a wealth of multilateral environmental agreements covering everything from
access to environmental information63 to greenhouse gas emissions64 to persistent organic
pollutants.65 None of these agreements have employed an explicit human rights framing,
and most do not mention human rights.66
60

Philippe Sands, Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of
International Law 43, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Alan Boyle and David
Freestone, eds. 1999); see also MYRES S. MCDOUGALL, HAROLD LASSWELL AND LUNG-CHU CHEN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 38-44 (1980)(taking for granted that there is a direct
relationship between environmental protection and human rights.)
61
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declaration, ¶ 6,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1417. Dinah Shelton has
repeatedly argued that the Stockholm Declaration explicitly tied environmental protection to human rights.
Dinah Shelton, Human rights and the environment: what specific environmental rights have been
recognized? 35 DENVER J. INT‘L L.& POL. 129, 130-34 (2006); Dinah Shelton, Environmental Rights, in
PEOPLE‘S RIGHTS (Phillip Alston, ed. 2001). Certainly, Conference Secretary General Maurice Strong
opened the Conference with a speech that drew heavily on both the U.N. Charts and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 1972 Stockholm Conference Opening Statement, available at
http://www.mauricestrong.net/20080626103/speeches2/speeches2/stockholm.html.
62
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on the
Environment and Development, Annex I, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (1993)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
63
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (1999).
64
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
65
U.N. Environment Programme, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22,
2001, 40 I.L.M. 532 (2001).
66
Two regional agreements do recognize environmental rights: the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 24, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter], states that
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Yet that does not mean there have been no international initiatives concerning the
human right to a healthy environment. In 1990, the UN General Assembly adopted a
resolution declaring ―that all persons have the right to live in an environment which is
adequate to ensure their health and welfare.‖67 In 1994, the United Nations‘ Draft
Principles on Human Rights and the Environment proposed explicitly consolidating these
norms into an articulated right to a ―satisfactory environment‖68 by declaring that ―[a]ll
persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment.‖69 As
proposed, this right would encompass the right to be free ―from pollution, environmental
degradation and activities that adversely affect the environment‖70 as well as a positive
right to ―protection and preservation of the air, soil, water, and the essential processes and
areas necessary to maintain biological diversity and ecosystems.‖71 Fifteen years later,
however, the prospect for any such clear declaration of a human right to a healthy
environment seems quite distant.72
Even as progress stalled on articulating a free-standing human environmental right,
other parts of the Draft Principles on Human Right and the Environment seem to have
some legs. For example, Principle 10 specifically provided that:
Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at
the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access
to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including
information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely
available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including
73
redress and remedy, shall be provided.

―[a]ll peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development,‖
and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Protocol of San Salvador, Nov. 17, 1988, art. 11, 28 I.L.M. 161 [hereinafter Protocol
of San Salvador], recognizes the right of ―everyone ... to live in a healthy environment.‖
67
Resolution 45/94, adopted on 14 December 1990.
68
Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Annex I
(1994); See also, Human Rights and the Environment, final report prepared by Mrs. Fatima Zohra Ksentini,
Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994, par. 261. Princple 2 further proclaimed: ―All persons
have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment. This right and other human rights,
including civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, are universal, interdependent and
indivisible.‖ Id.
69
Draft Principles, Princ. 1, supra note 68. This proposition was reaffirmed by the International Law
Institute in its 1997 Strasbourg Session, and by Article 1 in the 1999 Bizkaia Declaration issued by
UNESCO and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Declaration of Bizkaia on the Right to the
Environment, 30 C/INF.11 available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001173/117321E.pdf.
70
Draft Principles, supra note 68. at Princ. 5.
71
Id. at Princ. 6.
72
As Gunther Handl cautions, ―it is one thing to acknowledge that human rights provisions are
amenable to being, and have been, used to secure incidental environmental objectives. It is something
altogether [sic] to proceed from this evidence to the postulation of an existing fundamental right to a clean
environment.‖ Handl, supra note __ at 128 (cautioning against misrepresenting aspirational environmental
human rights concepts as hard law, and recommending avoiding ―talismanic invocations of non-binding
resolutions‖ and other forms of soft law).
73
Draft Principles, supra note68 at Princ. 10.
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This emphasis on participation reiterates almost verbatim the procedural rights endorsed
by Principle 10 of the Rio Convention.74 Principle 18 of the Draft Human Rights Accord
elaborates on this broad endorsement of participation, explaining that the right to
participate extends to ―planning and decision-making activities and processes that may
have an impact on the environment and development.‖75 This commitment to
participation was ratified, albeit on the state level, in the Epoo Convention76 then
enshrined as an individual right in the Aarhus Convention.77 The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change similarly provides for public participation.78
These conventions, along with relevant international tribunal decisions, declarations
and soft law instruments, have generated a host of international norms in the context of
environmental rights.79 At the same time that these concepts are being elaborated, there is
also a vigorous debate about whether they have coalesced into a new customary law—the
right to a healthy environment.80 Rather than wade into those murky waters, this article
74

Principle 10 provides: Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on
hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decisionmaking processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making
information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress
and remedy, shall be provided. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, A/Conf.151/26 (14 June
1992)
available
at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentID=78&articleID=1163.
75
Draft Principles, supra note 68 at Princ. 18.
76
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention)
(Feb.
25,
1991),
Art.
3,
available
at
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/conventiontextenglish.pdf.
The Epoo Convention
guarantees non-discriminatory public participation in environmental impact procedures. Art. 2(6) provides
that ―[t]he Party of origin shall provide an opportunity to the public in areas likely to be affected to
participate in relevant impact assessment procedures regarding proposed activities and shall ensure that the
opportunity provided to the public of the affected party is equivalent to that provided to the public of the
Party of origin.‖
77
The full name of the agreement commonly known as the Aarhus Convention is the Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters, adopted in Aarhus (Denmark) on 25 June 1998 . The Preamble to the Aarhus Convention
―recognize[s] that adequate protection of the environment is essential to human wellbeing and the
enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to life itself.‖
78
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. In
particular Article 4(1)(i) obliges states to ―encourage the widest participation . . . including that of nongovernmental organizations.‖ Article 6 requires that parties promote and facilitate public access to
information and public participation.
79
Over the past few decades, there has been increased linkage between human rights and
environmental protection. In particular, scholars have written extensively about the viability of substantive
environmental rights claimed as human rights, and of procedural rights in environmental decisionmaking
claimed as human rights. See e.g., Ole W. Pedersen, European Environmental Human Rights and
Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming? 21 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 73, 74 (2008); Louis E.
Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under International Law? It Depends
on the Source, 12 COLO. J. INT‘L ENVTL. L & POL‘Y 1, 9 (2001); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights,
Environmental Rights and the Right to the Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 103, 105 (1991).
80
Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly Revisionist View, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 117 (1992); Phillip Alston,
Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 Am. J. Int‘l L. 607 (1984). See
generally, HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R.
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brackets the question of whether these emerging norms amount to an international human
right to a wholesome environment. Regardless of whether these environmental norms
amount to a human right on their own, they undoubtedly enrich our understanding of
human rights clearly articulated in the Universal Declaration81 and the Human Rights
Conventions82 like the right to life,83 health,84 culture85 and property.86 Justice
Weermantry, for one, has characterized protecting the environment as ―a vital part of
contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights
such as the right to health and the right to life itself.‖87 The United Nations Human Rights
Council recently reaffirmed that climate change ―has implications for the full enjoyment
of human rights‖ and proposed a detailed analytical study of the relationship between
climate change and human rights.88
Moreover, these emerging environmental norms certainly represent a gathering
international consensus about the relationship between states and individuals vis-à-vis the
environment, and about the association between international environmental norms and
already-established human rights.89 As interpretive tools, these norms can assist
Anderson eds., 1996). Along these lines, not a single alien tort claim case alleging violation of
environmental rights has been successful. See e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (dismissing environmental alien tort claim suit on political doctrine grounds); Flores v. Southern
Peru Copper Corp., 414 F. 3d 233 251-52 (2d Cir. 2003) (dismissing environmental claim on the ground
that the human rights to life, health and sustainable development were not yet jus cogens norms); Beanal v.
Freeport-McMorran, Inc. 969 F. Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. La. 1997)(finding that environmental tort allegations
did not allege a violation of a ―universal, definable and obligatory‖ international norm); Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc. 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration might
constitute a binding international environmental norm but dismissing the case on forum non conveniens
grounds); Amlon Metals v. FMC Corp. 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (1991)(finding that Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration did not constitute a binding international norm).
81
Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to the Environment, 28 STAN. J.
INT‘L L. 103 (1991).
82
The two main human rights covenants are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). There are numerous other human rights covenants
including:
83
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 3, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
84
Id. at Art. 25. ICESCR cite. One limitation of relying on the right to health as the basis for
environmental rights is that, like all rights in the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, it is subject to ―progressive realization‖ which means that its contours depend on the resources of
the state concerned.
85
Id. at Art. 27, ICESCR cite
86
Id. at Art. 17. Because of the politics of the cold war, the right to property was not codified in the
ICCPR and the ICESCR. It is, however, guaranteed by the African Charter, supra note __ Art. 14;
American Convention, supra note __ Art. 21; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol No.1, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
87
See Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 91 (Sept. 25) (Separate Opinion
of J. Weermantry).
88
Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 7, U.N. HRC, 7th Sess., U.N.
Doc.
A/HRC/7/L.21/Rev.1
(Mar.
26,
2008),
available
at
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=13920. The resolution was adopted without a vote.
http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=080328.
89
See Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International
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decisionmakers in the domestic regulatory sphere regardless of their precise status under
international law.
C. Key Environmental Human Rights Norms of Use in
Regulatory Decisionmaking
This section provides a brief introduction to the human rights norms of prior informed
consent, participation and transparency. These international rights are not limited to the
environmental decisionmaking context, nor are they the only human rights that might be
relevant to environmental decisions. However, these rights are particularly important in
the environmental context, and they also overlap significantly with statutory
decisionmaking procedures already enshrined in domestic law. Given, this overlap, they
are of particular interesting to anyone looking to use human rights to promote better
regulatory decisionmaking.
One means by which international human rights discourse has intersected with
environmental protection has been litigation in which communities argue that their
justiciable human rights are violated by activities that promote climate change. Along
these lines, the Inuit people filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights claiming that the acts and omissions of the United States with respect to
climate change are violating their human rights by destroying their Arctic home.90
Although it made headlines, the suit has so far gone nowhere.91 Communities in Africa‘s
Niger Delta had more success suing Shell Oil92 on the theory that its wasteful practice of
Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 71, 91-94 (2005) (proposing a four variable matrix for
assessing whether environmental harms constitute human rights violations).
90
Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations
Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (Dec. 7, 2005),
available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal_docs/petition-to-the-inter-american-commission-onhuman-rights-on-behalf-of-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf. For an indepth discussion of the Inuit
Petition, see Hari Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous
People’s Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 675 (2007).
91
The Inuit petition was dismissed without prejudice in 2006. Andrew C. Revkin, Inuit Climate Change
Petition Rejected, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2006, at A9. The Commission held hearings in early 2007. See Martin
Wagner, Testimony Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://
www.ciel.org/Publications/IACHR_Wagner_Mar07.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); see also Sheila WattCloutier, Global Warming and Human Rights, http:// www.earthjustice.org/library/references/Background-forIAHRC.pdf.
92
Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Co., Suit No. FHC/CS/B/153/2005, Order (Nov. 14,
2005), available at www.climate-law.org/cases. Shell has reportedly failed to comply with the court order
directing it to cease this wasteful practice. Climate Justice, Shell Fails to Obey Court Order to Stop Nigeria
Flaring,
Again
(May
2m
2007)
available
at
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/media/2007May2/. The World Bank estimates that the
quantity of gas being flared and vented annually amounts to 25% of the United State‘s annual natural gas
consumption. Indeed, the quantity of natural gas flared in Africa each year equals half of that continent‘s
power consumption. World Bank, Oil Producing Countries, Companies Can Help Mitigate Impact of
Climate Change by Reducing Gas Flaring, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/EXTGGFR/0,,contentMDK:21126
868~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:578069,00.html. Similarly, the African Commission
on Human and People‘s Rights found that Nigeria violated rights of the Ogoni people by aiding and
participating in oil extraction in their region. Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, ¶¶ 2, 52-57, available at www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/155-96.html
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―gas flaring,‖ which contributed more greenhouse gas emissions than all of the other subSaharan African sources combined, constituted a human rights violation.93 There is also a
growing body of precedent concerning environmental issues as human rights violations in
both the European94 and Inter-American human rights systems.95 These cases help put
flesh to the bones of the emerging international norms about the environment.
In particular, this jurisprudence, together with the various human rights and
environmental regimes, establishes some clear principles that can enrich domestic
regulatory deliberations. Most notable among these are three procedural rights: the right
of prior informed consent;96 access to environmental information;97 and participation.98
(hereafter ―Ogoniland Case‖); see generally Dinah L. Shelton, Decision Regarding Communication 155/96
(Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr./Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Rights v. Nigeria). Case No.
ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 937 (2002).The Commission concluded that Nigeria violated
the right to health and the right to a healthy environment guaranteed by the African Charter. The
Ogoniland Case involved a challenge to the practices of disposing toxic wastes from oil production directly
into the environment, as well as to lax production practices that had resulted in numerous oil spills. Id. at ¶
2.
93
World Bank, Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association and the
International Finance Corporation to the Executive Directors on an Interim Strategy Update for the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report No. 23633-UNI (Feb. 13, 2002)par. 15, available at
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/case-documents/nigeria/report/section3/doc3.7.pdf. Perhaps the most
famous case invoking human rights in the struggle between oil development and environmental protection
was Wiwa v. Shell, which Shell Oil settled on the eve of trial for $15.5 million plus other compensation.
Brought under the United States Alien Tort Claims Act, the case alleged Shell Oil‘s complicity in torture
and crimes against humanity for the execution of poet and environmental activist Ken Siro Wiwa. The case
notably did not make an environmental human rights argument, in part because prior ATCA jurisprudence
has refused to consider environmental claims under this statute. The complaint in Wiwa v. Shell is
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/11.8.96%20%20Wiwa%20Complaint.pdf.
94
Budayeva v. Russia, App. No. 15339/02 at 26 ECHR [2008]; Taskin v.Turkey, 42 EHRR [2006] 50;
Fadeyeva v. Russia, EHRR[2005] 376; Lopez Ostra v. Spain 20 EHRR [1995] 277; Guerra & Others v. Italy,
App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357, 383 (1998) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) . For a scholarly exploration of these
cases, see Loukis Loucaides, Environmental Protection through the Jurisprudence of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 75 BRIT. Y.B. INT‘L L. 249 (2005); Richard Desgagne, Integrating
Environmental Values into the European Convention of Human Rights, 89 AM. J. INT‘L L. 263 (1995);
Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: Jurisprudence of Human Rights Bodies, 32 ENVTL.
POL. & L.158, 162 (2002)(surveying decisions).
95
See Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Report No. 40/04,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 727 (2004); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community v Nicaragua (2001), Inter-AM Ser. C, No. 79; Yanomani Indians v. Brazil, Decision 7615,
Inter-Am.C.H.R., Inter-American YB on Hum.Rts. 264 (1985). Several other claims have been held
admissible: Yakye Axa Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua people v. Paraguay, Case 12.313,
Report No. 2/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Doc.5 rev. 1 at 387 (2002); The Kichwa Peoples of the Sarayaku
community and its members v. Ecuador, Case 167/03, Report No. 62/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 308 (2004).
96
The right of advanced informed consent is the centerpiece of the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade,
http://www.pic.int/en/ConventionText/RC%20text_2008_E.pdf. It also plays a central role in the regimes
created by the Cartagena Protocol and the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208
[hereinafter Cartagena Protocol]; Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
97
The Aarhus Convention is the most notable articulation of this right. Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June

21
The following sections will describe each right in turn and will highlight how these
procedural rights relate to precautionary decisionmaking, another emerging international
norm, albeit one that is quite controversial in the United States.99 (The substantive
international environmental norms of: intergenerational equity;100 common but
differentiated responsibilities;101 and the polluter pays principle102 will not be discussed
in this analysis.) These international norms can help regulators better implement existing
domestic laws governing public participation in environmental decisionmaking. This
observation bears an obvious relationship to recent new governance scholarship,103 but
differs from that line of reasoning because it advocates interpreting existing procedures
through a human rights lens in order to develop a more robust understanding of existing
statutory goals and procedures, rather than suggesting new procedures to achieve
additional governance goals.
The following sections briefly sketch out the contours of these key international
environmental norms, with an eye toward highlighting those aspects most likely to be
relevant to domestic environmental regulators looking for guidance as they engage in
discretionary decisionmaking.
1. Prior Informed Consent
A mainstay of modern medical ethics, informed consent requires that physicians
obtain the voluntarily consent of a patient, which must be based on adequate information,
before subjecting that patient to medical procedures.104 Rooted in the principle of
―autonomy in medical decisionmaking,‖ informed consent reflects the notion that a
25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 450, available at http:// www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf
[hereinafter Aarhus Convention]. In particular, Article 1 of the Aarhus Convention guarantees access to
information, public participation , and access to justice in environmental matters.
98
See Aarhus Convention, Art. 1, supra note 97.
99
This is probably the most controversial of the emerging norms. See generally. THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION (David Freestone and Ellen
Hay, eds. 1995). For a full discussion of how this principle played out in the dispute between the United
States and the European Union over genetically modified agricultural crops, see Gregory Shaffer and Mark
Pollack, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS (2009)
100
EDITH BROWN-WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 17-46 (1989). Intergenerational
equity is also invoked in Art. 1 of the Aarhus Convention.
101
Dinah Shelton, Describing the Elephant: International Justice and Environmental Law 55-63, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEXT (Jonal Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa, eds. 2009). See e.g.,
Philippe Sands, International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal Principles 5466 in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Winfried Lang, ed. 1995) (describing all the
emerging international environmental law principles listed in the text above.)
102
The polluter pays principle dates back to the Trail Smelter Arbitration and is among the most
venerable and well-established principles of international environmental law. For a full discussion of the
Trail Smelter Arbitration, including edited versions of the decisions themselves, see generally REBECCA M.
BRATSPIES & RUSSELL A. MILLER, TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE
TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION (2006)
103
See e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 270 (1998); Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation,
54 DUKE L. J. 795 (2005); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 356-61 (2004).
104
Barbara L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 591, 595 (2006). See
also JESSICA W. BERG, ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 12-16 (2001)
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fundamental aspect of personhood is the freedom from unwanted or unauthorized
physical contact.105 In short, this legal concept, which flows from traditional tort law,
recognizes that the essence of being a person, rather than an object is the ability to have
some say in what happens to one, particularly with regard to bodily integrity. Thus, prior
informed consent is a profound recognition of the humanity of those whose consent is
being sought.
For this reason, as the concept was imported into the international environmental
arena, it became closely identified with environmental human rights. The Basel
Convention106 and the Cartagena Protocol107 both contain explicit provisions requiring
prior informed consent from affected states. The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals in International Trade is
the definitive statement of international law on this point.108 Parties to the Convention
commit not to export certain specified chemicals to the other state parties unless those
states explicitly consent.109 The Convention secretariat acts as a clearinghouse for these
state decisions and provides other support to facilitate state implementation of the
Convention.
These treaty-based consent instruments mark an impressive international statement
about the centrality of prior informed consent. However, they share a common limitation.
They treat prior informed consent as an aspect of state sovereignty. Their principle
achievement is to insert the national government as a gatekeeper between private actors
that wish to engage in a particular transaction involving hazardous substances. The
thinking behind this requirement is that the private actors are likely not giving adequate
attention to the public concerns inherent in such a transaction. The state‘s consent is
therefore solicited to ensure that public concerns are not compromised by the otherwise
private decision. This requirement also seeks to rectify one of the lingering effects of
colonialism—the exploitation of national resources by foreign entities conducted without
attention to the costs and benefit of that exploitation for the state in which those resources
are found.
While certainly important for international equity, this focus on prior informed
consent as an aspect of national sovereignty means that the impact of these procedures is
105

Atwell, supra note 104 at 594.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.190/4, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989).
107
Article 19(3) of the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity provides: ―The Parties shall
consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate procedures, including, in
particular, advance informed agreement, in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living
modified organisms resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity.‖ The Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety implements this directive by
including a provision that requires advanced informed agreement by the importing party prior to the first
international transboundary movement of living modified organisms for intentional introduction into the
environment. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39
I.L.M. 1027 (2000). For an explanation of the import of this provision, see Sabrina Safrin, The Biosafety
Protocol: A Landmark International Agreement, 10 MSU-DCL J. Int'l L. 63, 68-69 (2001).
108
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals
and Pesticides in International Trade, available at http://www.pic.int/home.php?type=t&id=49&sid=16.
109
The convention came into force in February 2004, and currently has 131 signatories. It is the
successor to a voluntary set of procedures developed by UNEP and FAO in the late 1980s, and is thus also
an interesting example of how soft law can harden into binding international obligations.
106
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relatively limited. They require only that the state consent to activity within its borders
that originates from outside the state, and offer no protection to sub-national units
unwilling to host activities consented to by the state.110 These international prior
informed consent provisions do nothing to respond to the well-documented problem of
states authorizing exploitation with little or no attention to the needs of the populations
most directly affected.111 Particularly with regard to indigenous peoples, this problem has
long been a vexing aspect of international development aid and investment.112
Responding to this serious gap in international law, there is a long tradition of soft
law instruments recognizing the need for prior informed consent at the sub-national
level.113 In particular, the World Bank has made some progress in articulating the need
for prior informed consent from indigenous and local stakeholders in its funding
priorities.114 The recently adopted Declaration of Indigenous Rights emphasizes prior
informed consent as an aspect of the right to property, the right to culture and the right to
indigenous people‘s sovereignty.115 The gap between the letter of these documents and
their implementation notwithstanding, this concept is continually being further developed
and refined in the international arena.
At least one international human rights court has interpreted human rights as
requiring significantly more from prior informed consent. The Inter-American Court of
110

This is not universally true for international soft law documents. For example, Article 26(d) of the
Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising
Out of their Utilization, provides for obtaining consent, where appropriate from indigenous and local
communities. Article 29 also points out that consent might be required from multiple levels of government
within the state. Of course the contours of the ―where appropriate‖ caveat are left to the discretion of the
state. Similarly, the Council of Parties to the Convention on Biodiversity has agreed that states should
recognize community rights over traditional knowledge, and develop appropriate local prior informed
consent procedures. Decision V/16 of the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity, Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, Annex: Programme of Work, I. General
Principles, at 139-42, UNEP, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23 (2000), available at http://
www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.asp?lg=0&dec=V/16.
111
For a description of why states cannot always be trusted to protect their citizens, especially
indigenous peoples, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, The New Discovery Doctrine 31 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
REVIEW 253 (2007).
112
See e.g. GILLETTE HALL & HARRY PATRINOS, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT
(2010) http://indigenouspeoplesissues.com/attachments/5065_IP-Poverty-Development2010.pdf; Economic
and Social Council, Indigenous Groups Call for Halt by Foreign Companies to Land Use for Oil Mining,
Permanent
Forum
on
Indigenous
Peoples
HR
4985
(May
21,
2009)
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/hr4985.doc.htm.
113
See, Indigenous Declaration, supra note __. ILO Convention 169.
114
See Robert Goodland, Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group,
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, Summer 2004, at 66, 66; Fergus MacKay, Indigenous Peoples' Right
to Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank's Extractive Industries Review, 4 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L & POL‘Y 43, 49 (Summer 2004); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Inter-agency Support
Group on Indigenous Issues Report on Free Prior and Informed Consent E/C.19/2004/11 ¶ 46 (May 2004)
[hereinafter UNESC]; World Bank Group, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE: THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
REVIEW (2003), available at http:// go.worldbank.org/PIW55278X0 (recommending that prior informed
consent be obtained from local communities); LYLA MEHTA & MARIA STANKOVITCH,
OPERATIONALIZATION OF FREE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT 5, 10 (2000). See also WORLD COMM‘N ON
DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING, THE REPORT OF THE WORLD
COMMISSION ON DAMS (2000), available at http://www.dams.org.
115
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, arts. 10-11, 19, 28-29, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html.
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Human Rights has recognized prior informed consent as a central aspect of the right to
property and the right to culture for indigenous groups.116 This interpretation of prior
informed consent protects sub-national units, particularly indigenous groups, from the
actions of the state.117 This interpretation is wholly consistent with the African
Commission‘s human rights ruling in the Ogoniland Case.118 Both cases upheld the right
to meaningful consultation, which necessarily entails meaningful opportunities to be
heard and to participate in development decisions affecting the communities.119
The United States is not a signatory to either the treaties or many of the soft-law
agreements that require prior informed consent, nor has it consented to the jurisdiction of
the Inter-American Court. As a result, neither the treaties nor the tribunal decisions are
legally binding on the United States. Nevertheless, there is much that United States
domestic regulators might learn from the developing international notion of prior
informed consent that would be informative as those regulators implement analogous
requirements under domestic law. In particular, domestic regulators might internalize the
notion that it is the government‘s responsibility to empower the individuals and groups
most affected by environmental problems in order to facilitate their participation in
decisionmaking that will affect them.120
2. Access to Information and Transparency
The European Court of Human Rights has on more than one occasion evaluated
procedures for environmental decisionmaking through a human rights lens. Article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees freedom to receive and impart
information. Although this provision creates neither a right to access information nor a
duty to disclose information, subsequent legal developments, in particular Council
Directive 2003/4121 have fleshed out this right as requiring access to environmental
information.122 Reading Article 10 with Articles 2 and 8, the European Court of Human
Rights has concluded that information about environmental risks must be made available
to those likely to be affected.123 This requirement includes an obligation for the state to
116

Maya Indigenous Communities v. Belize, Case No. 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 78/00,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 129 (2000) [hereinafter Maya case]; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, at 151 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter
Awas Tingni case]; Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 145 (June
15, 2005).
117
For a discussion of prior informed consent as a human right, see James S. Anaya & Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the
Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (2001)
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Soc. And Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, ¶¶ 52-53
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European Parliament and of the Council of Europe, Public Access to Environmental Information,
Dir. 2003/4/EC available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:041:0026:0032:EN:PDF
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In particular, Article 1 of Directive 2003/4 requires, as a matter of course, that environmental
information be ―progressively made available and disseminated to the public in order to achieve the widest
possible systematic availability and dissemination to the public of environmental information.‖
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Taskin, 2004-X 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50, 206, (2005) (citing the Aarhus Convention, Principle 10 of the
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provide access to studies and assessments carried out as part of the environmental and
economic policy decisionmaking process.124
At the same time, the Aarhus Convention preamble explicitly recognizes the nexus
between environmental protection and human rights.125 Article 1 provides that ―in order
to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present and future
generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, each
Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in decisionmaking, and access to justice.‖126 These three, interrelated rights, which find elaboration
throughout the rest of the convention, give legal force to the ideas enshrined in Principle
10 of the Rio Declaration.
The European Court of Human Rights has also weighed in on the scope of a right
of access to information. Under certain circumstances, the ECHR has concluded that this
right to information can require much more from the state than merely having a
procedure for providing information that is requested. Instead, this right can sometimes
include a positive state duty to inform, not merely a right of access to information.127 This
jurisprudence lines up with the Aarhus Convention‘s positive duty to inform, which
extends beyond merely having a process for providing requested information.128
Interpreting this requirement, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe have
concluded that the Convention imposes an obligation for states to take the measures
necessary ―to ensure that public authorities organise the environmental information which
is relevant to their functions and which is held by or for them, with a view to its active
and systematic dissemination to the public.‖129
While none of these developments bind the United States, that fact alone does not
end the conversation about their possible usefulness. As many law professors are fond of
reminding their students, an otherwise nonbinding legal precedent, norm or principle
becomes so-called ―persuasive authority‖ precisely because it persuades the
decisionmaker.130 As domestic regulators grapple with the interpretation of analogous
Rio Declaration and the 2003 Council of Europe Recommendation); Oneryildiz 2004-XII 41 Eur. Ct. H. R.
20.
124
Taskin, supra note __ at 206; see also Giacomelli v. Italy, App. No. 59909/00, at 17-18 (2008).
125
Aarhus Convention, supra note 97.
126
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Econ. Comm‘n for Europe, The Aarhus Convention:
An Implementation Guide, 29, U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/72 (2000).The Aarhus Convention operates under the
assumption that access to information and participation improves environmental protection. See generally
Jenny Steele, Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-Solving
Approach, 21 O.J.L.S. 415 (2001) (arguing that enhanced participation may lead to better environmental
protection while emphasizing the problem-solving benefits associated with this approach). But see Maria
Lee & Carolyn Abbot, The Usual Suspects? Public Participation Under the Aarhus Convention, 66 MOD.
L. REV. 80, 86 (2003) (questioning whether public access to information and participation improves
environmental protection).
127
Guerra, 26 Eur. Ct. H. R. 382.
128
Aarhus Convention, supra note 97 at Art. 5(1)(c).
129
European Parliament and of the Council of Europe, Public Access to Environmental Information,
Dir. 2003/4/EC, Art. 7(1) available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:041:0026:0032:EN:PDF
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There has been very little attention paid to the role of persuasive authority in the regulatory context.
One interesting study on the role of persuasive authority in the context of judicial decisionmaking by the
Canadian Supreme Court is Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J.
INT‘L L. 409 (2003). See also Fredrick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1943
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provisions under United States law, it may well make sense for them to draw examples
and lessons from this well-developed parallel body of knowledge about access to
information.
3. Public Participation
Recent events demonstrate the ever-widening scope of the right to participate. In
December 2009, Micronesia challenged the renewal of a Czech refinery‘s operating
permit on the ground that regulators had to consider the facility‘s outsized carbon
footprint and the transboundary effects these emissions would have in Micronesia. 131 By
demanding the right to participate in this domestic Czech regulatory decision, Micronesia
dramatically re-interpreted conventional notions of public participation.
Czech
authorities agreed to Micronesia‘s request, and are conducting a review under
international auspices.132 According to Greenpeace, this move is intended to be the
opening salvo as states vulnerable to climate change explore new avenues to challenge
decisions on projects that contribute to climate change. 133
Although not directly framed in the language of human rights, this decision will have
obvious implications for the ongoing discourse about the relationship between public
participation and human rights. This normative relationship is underscored in the
European Court of Human Rights‘ jurisprudence suggesting that, at least for some
decisions, participation in the decisionmaking process by those affected by environmental
decisions is a basic human right.134 Additionally, the Aarhus Convention, which
explicitly links participation and human rights, requires a right to participate as a basic
element of its framework of environmental process.135 Under the Convention, states are
required to inform the public of a proposed activity in an adequate, effective, and timely
manner; to provide a reasonable timeframe to inspect materials, to make comments; and
to promptly inform the public about the ultimate decision.136 However, the Convention‘s
requirements go far beyond this minimal vision of public participation.
The Aarhus Convention gives detailed and specific meaning to the generic ‗right
to participate‘ that is a central principle to most democratic theory and is viewed
throughout much of the world as a fundamental human right as well as a right created by
positive law.137 While the United States is not a party to the Aarhus Convention, and
therefore is not bound by its provisions, that does not preclude the US from learning from
(2008)(pointing out that a ―judge who is genuinely persuaded by an opinion from another jurisdiction is not
taking the other jurisdiction's conclusion as authoritative . . .. [r]ather, she is learning from it .. . .)
131
See e.g., James Kanter, A Pacific Island Challenge to European Air Pollution, NEW YORK TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2010); Veronica Webster, Micronesia Challenges Czech Coal Plant Extension (Jan. 18, 2010)
http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2010/micronesia_CEZ. Their argument was that Czech domestic
law required consideration of the transboundary effects from the Prunerov plant, the largest single emitter
in the Czech republic, which has a greenhouse gas footprint more than 40 times that of all of Micronesia.)
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Leos Rousik, Micronesia Gets Power-Plant Review, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2010)
133
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/teia_fsm.pdf
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Taskin, 2004-X Cr. Ct. H.R. 1149 (interpreting Art. 8 of the European Convention.)
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Aarhus Convention, supra note 97 at Art. 6.
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Aarhus Convention, supra note 97 at Art. 6.
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the experiences of those states that are. For example, one important aspect of the
Convention‘s public participation provisions is that they apply not only to particular
projects but also to overall planning and policy development.138 Public participation at
these earlier, less visible stages of decisionmaking can help shape the context within
which particular projects are proposed, authorized or rejected. Indeed, the very drafting
of the Convention modeled this kind of participatory inclusion, with NGOs taking an
unusual and prominent role in the drafting, negotiation and implementation of the
Convention.139 This type of approach might have resonance in the ongoing domestic
debate over the scope and timing of public participation in United States rulemaking.
International law has devoted considerable time and energy fleshing out the
contours of prior informed consent, participation and transparency and access to
information. This accumulated pool of wisdom offers a valuable resource to United
States regulators as they seek to improve domestic regulation. Because of some striking
similarities in the domestic and international regimes, United States regulators might
fruitfully draw on the intellectual fruits of these international law labors.
III.

TESTING THE THEORY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION

The United States has historically been in the environmental vanguard—leading the
world in developing innovative substantive and procedural requirements like:
environmental impact statement, innovative transparency mechanisms like the Freedom
of Information Act and the Toxic Release Inventory, and the notion that regulatory
standards can be used to force the development of more environmentally-sound
technologies. For decades, public sentiment in the United States overwhelmingly
supported this environmental regulatory apparatus.140 Yet, over the last decades, the
United States has become an environmental laggard—failing to participate in key
international environmental regimes,141 and eroding regulatory rigor by overreliance on
138

Aarhus Convention, supra note 97 at Art. 7. The Convention does not, however, give citizens a
means to directly invoke the right to live in an adequate environment. See e.g. TIM HAYWARD,
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 180 (2005)
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See Jerzy Jendroska, UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making,and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters: Towards More Effective Public
Involvement in Monitoring Compliance and Enforcement in Europe, 13 Nat‘l Envt‘l Enforcement J. 153,
156 (1998); See Sean T. McAllister, The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 10 COLO J. INT‘L ENVTL. L & POL‘Y
187, 189 (1999); Jeremy Wates, The Aarhus Convention: a Driving Force for Environmental Democracy, 2
JEEPL 2, 9-10 (2005) (arguing that presence of NGOs at the negotiations helped steer the convention
towards solving the problems that it sets out to tackle).
140
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10,
2010)
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/1508/
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simple-minded cost-benefit analyses.142 At the same time, allegations of environmental
injustice continue to dog many environmental regulatory processes.143 As a result, the
United States environmental regulatory system has lost much of its momentum. With
environmental regulation and administrative law stagnating or regressing, an infusion of
new ideas from international human rights law might help regulators chart a new
regulatory course that will better protect the environment while also building public trust
in the regulatory process.
To examine this point, we will begin by examining how the norms of prior-informed
consent, participation, and transparency and access to information are already constructed
in domestic law, and will identify the points where these existing domestic instantiations
of these international norms fall short. This section will then highlight two key challenges
for domestic environmental decisionmaking: uncertainty and environmental justice.
Finally, this section will end by showing how a closer embrace of international norms
within the domestic regulatory process might being to overcome those challenges.
A. The Existing Regulatory Scaffolding
One of the most important procedural innovations in United States environmental law
is the role that citizen suit provisions play in enforcing environmental laws. It is also an
area where domestic regulation stands to benefit the most from an infusion of new ideas
from international human rights.
Almost every anti-pollution law authorizes citizens to act as ―private attorneys
general‖ and sue to enforce environmental laws when regulators fail to live up to
statutory enforcement duties.144 These laws permit citizens to bring enforcement against
violators, and to sue to force agencies to discharge nondiscretionary duties. Through
these provisions, Congress has authorized citizens to become directly involved with the
process of enforcing environmental standards and to pursue their environmental interests
when the state fails to do so on their behalf. These statutes thus provide for individual
enforcement of duly promulgated environmental standards, should the government fail to
do so in its representative capacity.
In addition to environmental statutes that create specific public enforcement
rights, additional legislative enactments create a clear set of participatory rights and
requirements. For example, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that ―agenc[ies]
shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate‖145 in proposed rulemaking

Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, to name a few.
142
For an elaboration of this point, see e.g., LISA HEINZERLING AND FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICELESS:
ON KNOWING THE COST OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2005).
143
See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38 ELR 10,287
(2008), and parts __infra.
144
The following environmental laws, inter alia, provide citizen enforcement authority: the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §6972; the Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §1104; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §9659; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1365(a); the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §7604; the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §1540; the Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C.
§300j-8; the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §2619; the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act, 30 U.S.C. §1270.
145
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553(c)
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decisions and to ―petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.‖ 146
D.C. Circuit noted two decades ago:

As the

[u]nder our system of government, the very legitimacy of general
policymaking performed by unelected regulators depends in no small part
upon the openness, accessibility and amenity of these officials to the needs
and ideas of the public from whom their ultimate authority derives and
upon whom their commands must fall.147
Note how similar these rights are to aspects of the emerging environmental norms of
access to information and prior informed consent that are part of the putative right to a
healthy environment.148 Some argue that these environmental rights have largely been
read out of the domestic environmental statutes. NEPA, in particular, has been interpreted
to create predominantly procedural, rather than substantive rights.149 As a result, its
putative role as an ―environmental Magna Carta‖150 and as ―a national charter for
protection of the environment‖151 has been blunted. At the same time, unambiguous
environmental commitments in the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and other
environmental statutes have been interpreted creatively to diminish environmental rights
into mere ―interests‖ that can be weighed against costs and other ―interests.‖ This framing
creates a structural disadvantage because the environmental stake, which has dwindled
into an ―interest‖ must frequently face off against property interests, which are given the
status of rights.152 More fundamentally, the doctrines of standing153 and political
question154 have been used to limit the scope of who can access the courts in order to
146
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generally, CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW,
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claim these rights. Would-be environmental litigants find themselves at a cross-road—
with their main path of past vindication, the courts, becoming less available. The
legislature has not indicated much appetite to fill this void, indeed a host of
environmental proposals have languished in the past few Congressional sessions.155
Even without new laws, and with access to the federal courts becoming more
difficult, human rights norms might still be a tool for more effectively realizing the
environmental rights guaranteed under federal law. Achieving this outcome entails
recognizing that regulators sit in a locus of ―authoritative decisionmaking,‖ and bringing
human rights norms to the regulators themselves. In particular, the international norms of
prior informed consent, participation and transparency and access to information might
help regulators apprehend and employ their existing regulatory discretion in a fashion
more likely to achieve environmental outcomes, and at the same time more likely to
rebuild public trust in the regulatory enterprise. In short, a human rights framing might
reshape the contours of what is currently considered appropriate exercise of discretion in
order to make regulatory decisionmaking more transparent, more responsive and more
fair.
Nowhere is the need for new regulatory approaches clearer than in the nascent
regulatory response to climate change—the most pressing regulatory challenge of our
lifetime.156 The regulatory response began in earnest when EPA announced its intention
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act157 and
announced reporting rules for stationary sources.158 Rapidly on the heels of these
announcements, the SEC issued greenhouse gas guidance.159 Far more will be required,
and many agencies will find themselves forced to grapple with regulatory challenges
presented by climate change—ranging from the Army Corps of Engineers rethinking
wetlands development as storm intensities magnify, to the Fisheries and Wildlife Service
(FWS) accounting for climate change in designating and protecting endangered species,
to the Department of Transportation reconsidering CAFÉ standards.
These agencies, and many others, face hard choices that will impose significant costs

Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. C 08-1138 SBA (N.D. Cal, September 30, 2009),available at
http://www.shopfloor.org/wp-content/uploads/kivalina-order-granting-motions-to-dismiss.pdf.
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Most notably, despite considering more than a dozen bills, the 111th Congress failed to adopt any
climate change legislation. For a description of the various proposals, see Resources for the Future, An
Introduction to Climate Change Legislation http://www.rff.org/climatechangelegislation.
156
For a description of the social and political response to climate change to date, see Joshua P. Howe,
Making Global Warming Green: Climate Change and American Environmentalism 1957-1992
(unpublished PhD thesis 2010) copy on file with author. For the history of climate science, see SPENCER
WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING (2003).
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Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of
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Turning to Legal Action to Stop EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gases, SOLVECLIMATE (June 14, 2010)
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Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 64260 (Oct. 30, 2009).
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Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,290
(Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf.
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on the public in order to (they hope) confer benefits. 160 Worse, regulators will not be
able to avoid making high stakes regulatory choices that implicate poorly understood
risks. Under these conditions, trust in the agency decisionmaking processes will be
particularly important. Without confidence that the agency procedures are fair and
inclusive, and that the agency is making decisions in the public‘s interest, there is a real
danger that any choices made under conditions of uncertainty will provide fodder for
anger, social disaffection and cynicism. Agencies are often put in this role. Given the
pervasive scientific uncertainty surrounding many environmental regulatory decisions,
Congress has often elected to vest expert regulators with significant discretion to assess
risks, probabilities and costs.161 Courts are often reluctant to second-guess these expert
decisions made on ―the frontiers of science.‖162 Thus, getting the initial regulatory
decisions right is critical.
The struggle over information and decisionmaking in the context of climate change is
clear. In rulemakings, lawsuits and public opinion, a handful of scientists and
environmental groups jockey for influence against industry-funded climate deniers.163
Lost in the cacophony is any genuine public dialogue about the rapid environmental
160

Some very high profile climate change cases have been filed alleging nuisance theories. For
example, the Second Circuit recently allowed a suit to proceed against major greenhouse gas emitters on
nuisance theories. Connecticut v. AEP, 582 F.3d 309 (2 nd Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit had reached a
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changes we are witnessing,164 or what those changes will mean for our carbon-based
economy.165 As the United States grapples with the proper balance between the nation‘s
immediate economic crisis and its long-term sustainability interests,166 regulators should
consider drawing on human rights norms to make regulatory responses fairer, more
transparent, and more effective.
B. Balancing Expertise and Participation
Because agencies rest a bit uncomfortably within a constitutional system premised on
a separation of powers, regulators are often reluctant to acknowledge the political
implications of their discretionary decisionmaking. Instead, they tend to portray the
questions within their purview as scientific and technical rather than political. The main
advantage of such a characterization is that it renders the decisions in question
susceptible to expert decisionmaking. One unfortunate side effect of this ‗expert-izing‘ of
regulatory decisionmaking is that framing regulatory decisions as based on expertise has
a direct and limiting impact on how agencies approach issues of participation,
transparency and access to information.167 Another is that it allows regulators to dismiss,
or even be contemptuous of the risk preferences and priorities expressed by the public,
thereby bracketing questions surrounding different perceptions about acceptability of
risk,168 and directing regulatory attention away from low-probability, high risk
scenarios.169
The temptation toward an expertise framing is easy to appreciate. Certainly,
regulators must pay attention to science, and make decisions supported by evidence.
164
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That means avoiding decisions based on either political expedience or wild swings of
public opinion. But, rarely are regulatory decisions wholly about science. Instead, most
regulatory decisions are about policy—choosing which risks are acceptable in a
democratic society, and then deciding who should bear those risks. In making those kinds
of choices, regulators should always be mindful of the limits of technical expertise170 to
answer questions of acceptability and equity.
One problem with framing regulatory decisions as wholly scientific rather than a
combination of scientific and social decisionmaking is that such a framing makes it easy
to ignore the social aspects of a regulatory decision, and to dismiss concerns articulated
by the general public. Experts are notorious for overestimating the importance of their
field of expertise and underestimating what other perspectives might contribute.171 The
―unwillingness to reflect on the status of their own knowledge,‖172 can obscure
significant gaps in information. This intellectual hubris173 is further exacerbated by the
tendency to defer to the opinion of an ―expert‖ in public discourse, even when the
opinion concerns matters beyond (and sometimes only distantly related to) the person‘s
area of expertise. This kind of ―expert haloing‖ unfortunately lends itself to strategic
behavior by those with an interest in hampering regulatory responses to otherwise
obvious problems.174 For example, by the late 1980s, climate experts had concluded with
surprising unanimity that the increased releases of greenhouse gases from human
activities would significantly raise the earth‘s temperature in the next century. 175 Yet two
decades later, so-called experts (albeit not climatologists) are still opining to the contrary,
allowing politicians and industry groups to continue claiming that the connection
between carbon emissions and climate change is unproven.176
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Framing a regulatory choice as an expert rather than a social choice not only gives
license to this particular kind of obstructionism, it also creates a high hurdle to
participation by those less comfortable and familiar with expert discourse. Language,
education, and resource limitations can impede the ability to participate in administrative
processes. The fact that these impediments are typically neither explicit nor legal barriers
to participation does not resolve the problem. Regulators must confront the unfortunate
reality that those facing the greatest barriers to participation are often those most likely to
wind up bearing the greatest environmental burdens.177 When the available processes for
public participation wind up effectively excluding the most vulnerable portions of the
affected population, the decisionmaking process fails. Not only do the resulting gaps in
information and perspective make it less likely that the regulatory decisions will protect
all of society, but the process itself winds up undermining rather than enhancing public
trust in the regulatory process. When they ignore the problem of differential access to
participation mechanisms, regulators become vulnerable to the accusation that they are
trying to pass an insider dialogue off as a genuine public discourse. 178 Recognizing this
as a problem can be the first step to revitalizing the laws that foster public participation in
environmental decisionmaking. In taking these steps, human rights norms can provide
guidance. Before exploring that guidance in detail, however, it is worth considering how
a human-rights mediated move from an expert framing to a social decisionmaking
framing can help regulators respond to the profound critique of existing regulatory
decisionmaking leveled by the environmental justice movement.
C. The Challenge of Environmental Justice
Administrative agencies are mandated to protect all Americans, not just those who
can afford lawyers, lobbyists and experts. Environmental justice advocates have long
complained that existing United States environmental laws systematically fail to achieve
their promise for discrete and predictable segments of society—namely poor
communities of color. These advocates make the case that poverty and pollution are
inextricably and inappropriately linked.179 They point to the disproportionate siting of
locally-undesirable land uses (LULUs), that typically come with a significant pollution
load, in poor and minority communities,180 and the lack of access those same
communities often have to greenspace, parks and other environmental amenities.181
Thus, they advocate for examining regulatory decisionmaking through an environmental
justice lens in order to break the existing association between race and environmental
Tobacco's Tactics to "Manufacture Uncertainty" on Climate Change (2007).
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hazards.182 Among the most recent examples of this phenomenon are the allegations that
the majority of wastes generated from the cleanup of BP‘s oil spill are being disposed of
in communities of color.183
Environmental justice questions have been a focus on public attention for
decades. The 1982 demonstrations against the siting of a hazardous waste landfill in
predominantly African-American Warren county in North Carolina is typically identified
as the birth of the environmental justice movement.184 A few years later, government185
and private reports186 began providing hard data for the contention that hazardous waste
facilities and contaminated sites were disproportionately more likely to be located in
minority communities. Based in part on these studies, EPA concluded that racial and
ethnic minorities were disproportionately exposed to pollutants of all kinds and that
African-American children had disproportionately high blood lead levels (which leads to
an array of adverse health effects).187 At the same time, the National Law Journal found
racial disparities in the enforcement of federal environmental laws.188 Recognizing the
potential of these findings to undermine the legitimacy of the entire regulatory enterprise,
President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898.189 This order directed federal agencies
to make environmental justice part of their mission.

182
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The Obama administration has made environmental justice one of its
environmental priorities.190 Guidance issued in July 2010 identified achieving
environmental justice as an EPA priority, and directed that environmental justice be
factored into every agency decision.191 Yet, as the concerns surrounding disposal of the
BP oil spill waste demonstrate, actually transforming regulatory decisionmaking to better
reflect the environmental justice principles of ―fair treatment and meaningful
involvement‖192 is no easy task.
EPA‘s recent efforts to define and integrate environmental justice are an
important step forward. Now, it, along with the other agencies of the federal government,
needs to heed the GAO‘s repeated calls for measurable benchmarks for assessing
progress toward environmental justice.193 In developing these benchmarks, the body of
knowledge that has grown up around international human rights offers some useful
guidance. The well-developed international procedures for prior informed consent,
participation, access to information and transparency may be instructive as regulators
grapple with how to internalize environmental justice. In particular, these international
norms can help regulators: clarify ambiguities in key statutory terms; identify appropriate
affirmative steps to promote wider participation in regulatory decisionmaking; and offer
models for analyzing environmental justice issues as part of routine agency processes. In
short, human rights norms can help regulators give existing regulatory processes a new
normative gloss, one more likely to generate progress in responding to the thorny
problem of delivering environmental justice.
Starting from the principle that communities are entitled to participate fully and
meaningfully in decisions affecting them, numerous laws require consultation and even
local consent before certain activities can proceed. NEPA itself specifically states that its
purpose is to ―insure that environmental information is available to public officials and
citizens before decisions are made and before action is taken.‖ 194 Unfortunately,
environmental justice has highlighted the widespread failure to realize this principle
across a wide swath of regulatory decisionmaking.195 Indeed, there is often strong
190
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resistance to even recognizing that environmental inequities exist, or ought to be viewed
as a problem of structural inequality in society. Changing things will be even more
difficult.
Full and meaningful participation involves access to decision making processes
concerning the environment, and may require that regulators provide resources (such as
expert assistance) needed to ensure a level playing field. For example, in response to the
BP oil spill, EPA‘s Department of Environmental Justice offered community grants for
the purpose of facilitating meaningful involvement in the responses to the spill by
developing information about, or capacity in, affected communities.196
The Obama administration has expressed a commitment to transparency, marking a
significant break from the prior Bush administration.197 However, these basic building
blocks of regulatory trust are too important to be left to the vagaries of particular
administrations. Incorporating human rights norms into the fabric of regulatory
decisionmaking would depersonalize human rights compliance, thereby helping to ensure
implementation regardless of who holds the White House and who is head of the agency.
One thing a human rights framing for the EIS process might accomplish would be to
help significantly expand participation in public decisionmaking, as well as transparency
and access to information. Such a result would greatly enhance both the perceived
legitimacy of the EIS process and its overall usefulness.198 Paying attention to the
STATES 13-14 (2000); Eileen Gauna, EPA at Thirty: Fairness in Environmental Protection, 31 ENVTL.
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& Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into EPA Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q.
617 (1999); John A. Hird & Michael Reese, The Distribution of Environmental Quality: An Empirical
Analysis, 79 SOC. SCI. Q. 693, 711 (1998). Evan J. Ringquist, Equity and the Distribution of
Environmental Risk: The Case of TRI Facilities, 78 SOC. SCI.Q. 811, 818 (1997).
196
EPA, Environmental Justice Cooperative Agreements in Support of Communities Directly Affected
by
the
Deepwater
Horizon
Oil
Spill
in
the
Gulf
of
Mexico,
Request
for
Proposals,http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/publications/grants/bp-spill-grants-rfp.pdf
197
On his first day in office, President Obama issued a Memorandum to the Heads of Agencies on the
Freedom of Information Act establishing a presumption in favor of disclosure of information.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FreedomofInformationAct/ This Presidential Memorandum
was a direct response to the Memorandum produced by Attorney General Aschcroft during the Bush
Administration in which Ashcroft was widely perceived as creating a default in favor of secrecy rather than
disclosure. http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/ashcroft.html. Attorney General Holder followed up with a
Memorandum implementing the President‘s directive. Eric Holder, Memorandum to Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies on the Freedom of Information Act (March 19, 2009)
http://www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf. President Obama later issued another, related
Presidential Memorandum on open government. see, Presidential Memorandum: Transparency and Open
Government, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment/.
Peter Orszag, President Obama‘s Director of OMB, followed up with a memorandum directing federal
agencies to concretize President Obama‘s transparency Memorandum by increasing the information they
made available online, and improving the quality of information they made available. See Memorandum
from Peter Orszag, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to the Heads of Executive Departments
and
Agencies
on
Open
Government
Directive,
(Dec.
8,
2009)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf
(identifying
transparency, participation and collaboration as the cornerstones of open government, and expressing the
intent to ―create and institutionalize a culture of open government)
198
Along these lines, a cornerstone of the European Union‘s 2001 White Paper on Governance was a
plan to democratize expertise by adopting new guidelines ―on the collection and use of expert advice in the
Commission to provide for the accountability, plurality and integrity of the expertise used.‖ Commission of

38
ramifications of power and the exclusionary role that unmediated expert discourse often
plays could make NEPA‘s EIS processes far more inclusive and rigorous. Such a
decisionmaking process would ensure that regulators, the regulated community and the
public beneficiaries of regulation shared an investment in regulatory policy, and would
set new expectations about fulfillment and maintenance of regulatory promises.199
1. Participation
Informed participation by citizens is the heart of much of modern environmental law
in the United States. The ideal of a truly mutual learning process between government
regulators, the regulated community and the beneficiaries of regulation is viewed as the
best way to both recognize "the profound impact of man's [sic] activity on . . . the natural
environment . . . ,"200 and to develop "a national policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man [sic] and his environment; [and] promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment ...."201
The most famous embodiment of this ideal is the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), the grand-daddy of all environmental statutes. Enacted in 1969, NEPA
mandates that the environmental consequences of government activities be given due
consideration. To that end, NEPA requires that the government identify and consider the
environmental consequences of its actions before making major decisions. 202 This statute
the European Communities, European Governance: A White Paper COM 19 (July 25 2001) available at
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has been replicated widely around the world, and has become a mainstay of international
environmental decisionmaking.203
Specifically, NEPA requires that any federal agency contemplating a ―major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment‖ conduct an
EIS in order to develop, assemble and analyze environmental information. 204 The EIS
must set forth sufficient information for the general public to make an informed
evaluation,205 and for the decisionmaker to ―consider fully the environmental factors
involved and to make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks of harm to the
environment against the benefits to be derived from the proposed action.‖206 Indeed, the
―heart of the environmental impact statement‖ is the analysis of alternatives to the
proposed action that ―rigorously explore[s] and objectively evaluate[s] all reasonable
alternatives, and alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study [along with a
discussion of] the reasons for their having been eliminated.‖207
Although NEPA was explicitly intended to further substantive environmental
goals, the EIS requirements it imposes on agencies have been interpreted as essentially
procedural rather than substantive.208 Thus, the EIS does not mandate outcomes209 but
instead acts to protect the integrity of agency decisionmaking by giving assurance that

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man‘s [sic] environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented. See also 40 C.F.R. Pt. 1508; Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
203
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stubborn problems or serious criticisms have not been ―swept under the rug.‖210 As ―the
outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during
the planning stage of agency actions,‖211 the EIS is intended to insure ―a fully informed
and well-considered decision.‖212
To that end, NEPA commits "all agencies of the Federal Government" to the
collection, use, and dissemination of information on the environment.213 Federal agencies
must, of course "initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and
development of resource-oriented projects."214 Those informational requirements do far
more than just ensure that agencies are well informed. Federal agencies also have a
positive obligation to "make advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and
enhancing the quality of the environment" available to States, counties, municipalities,
institutions, and individuals.215 One consequence of this requirement is that interested
persons are entitled to access government information in order to facilitate their
participation in this process. There is no doubt that NEPA was intended to provide
detailed environmental information to the public to permit meaningful participation.216
Intended to build public trust in the legitimacy and appropriateness of the
agency‘s ultimate decision, these procedural requirements make the agency identify and
account for the environmental costs and benefits of the proposed action as part of the
decisionmaking calculus. Although the agency has considerable discretion in balancing
the competing values implicated in any decision, the EIS requirement shines the bright
light of informed public scrutiny on that discretionary exercise of power. The assumption
is that an appropriate level of substantive environmental protection will flow from the
participatory and transparent agency decisionmaking process.
NEPA‘s overall environmental and administrative effectiveness has been subject
to fierce debate. Some view the EIS requirement as a significant cause of regulatory
ossification, while others claim it as the heart of successful environmental law.
Regardless of which camp one finds more persuasive, there is no doubt that NEPA‘s
procedural requirements have often acted as a significant check on agency actions. And
NEPA has been the model for similar laws around the world.
Yet, NEPA‘s current vision of access to information and public participation is
triggered very late in the decisionmaking process. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
limited the ability of interested citizens to challenge their inability to participate in the
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broader environmental planning processes,217 even though those early processes
inevitably structure how the agency exercises its discretion in subsequent project
applications. Agencies are therefore free to proceed without public participation at these
early stages of decisionmaking. However, agencies employing a human rights framing
might decide that, regardless of whether participation at early junctures is required, that
participation is valuable. After all, the Supreme Court‘s conclusion that citizens cannot
demand the right to participate in early, agenda-setting agency decisions does not mean
that agencies cannot elect to provide avenues for such participation. Lessons from the
more expansive right to participate developed under international human rights law, and
further refined in the Aarhus Convention might be valuable in helping agencies
understand why earlier participation is critical to the vitality of environmental
decisionmaking and how that participation might be structured. Acting on that
appreciation, regulators could choose to make the earliest stages of regulatory
decisionmaking more transparent, and could develop opportunities for participation all
along the regulatory pathway.
2. Transparency and Access to Information
It was none other than Lewis Brandeis who wrote that ―sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants.‖218 It is certainly not novel to propose transparency as a critical
component of sound regulatory decisionmaking. Indeed, the core of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) consists of rules for public notice, participation, and comment.219
The APA empowers citizens to interact with regulators through public meetings and
written submissions. These participatory rights are of vital importance to the democratic
legitimacy of administrative decisionmaking. United States disclosure statutes like the
Freedom of Information Act220 and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act221 have been influential around the world. For example, the ICJ recently
declared that the environmental assessment process that grew out of NEPA has become
customary international law.222
217
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Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2006).
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The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
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Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (2000). In
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Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River (Argentina v. Uruguay) Judgment of 20 April 2010, para.
204 (finding that the duty to undertake an EIA when there is a risk of transboundary pollution has achieved
customary international law status, even though international law does not specify the exact scope and

42
Taken together, these laws not only ―make[] environmental protection a part of
the mandate of every federal agency and department;‖223 they also ―insure that
environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions
are made and before action is taken.‖224 While statutes focus on providing information,
they leave the decision of how to use that information to individuals and the public as a
whole. Thanks to former Vice-President Gore‘s Reinventing Government225 initiative, a
significant proportion of United States‘ government information is readily available on
the internet.226 Availability of this information for public assessment and comment is
important.
Unfortunately, these statutes too often fall short of creating genuine opportunities
for public participation in the regulatory process.227 For example, NEPA has a very thin
vision of public access to information. It posits an initial flow of information from the
government to the public, and then a responsive flow from the public to the government.
As such, it elides the role that power differentials play in making the NEPA process
accessible to some but not others. For example, EISs typically involve an expert analytic
framework that can erect high barriers to participating in the dialogue at all.228 Legitimate
positions and voices not facile with, and thus unable to fit into the dominant discourse,
are often excluded.229 Along the same lines, turf wars between professional subcultures
content of such an EIA.) In a separate opinion in this case, Judge Cancado Trindade opined that the
precautionary principle had also attained the status of customary international law, see Case Concerning
Pulp Mills on the River (Argentina v. Uruguay) Judgment of 20 April 2010,, Separate Opinion of Judge
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For a summary of recent critiques of the state of transparency, see Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of
Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1014-15 & nn.9-12 (2008).
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within an agency—say between lawyers and economists—can also create bureaucratic
obstacles that hinder the effective incorporation of diverse perspectives in the
decisionmaking process.
Moreover, the access required by the APA and NEPA only applies once an
agency has developed a proposed course of action.230 Citizens are routinely excluded
from the earlier stages of the process—the forums in which substantive drafting decisions
are made, agendas are set, and decisionmaking rules are established.231 To the extent that
agencies get in the habit of adopting private industry standards as their regulatory
standards, as the Mineral and Mining Service, for example, did more than 100 times in its
regulation of offshore drilling, the perceptual and substantive problems associated with
this exclusion is compounded. Industry gets two bites at the apple—first, in a closed and
private process, industry develops its consensus standard, and then in the public
rulemaking based on that standard, industry gets a chance to comment on the proposed
agency action. The beneficiaries of health and safety regulation, by contrast, are
excluded from the private process by which industry develops its consensus standards,
and only gets to participate once a notice of proposed rulemaking is published. Thus the
public is, through no fault of its own, a ―Johnny come lately,‖—invited into the process
only once an agency has largely committed itself to a particular course. Although an
agency may modify a proposed action in light of public comments, those comments
typically come too late in the process to be genuinely transformative. When regulators
have already mapped out and published their intended approach, investing time, energy
and effort in its proposed action, it is very difficult to convince them to radically switch
gears—particularly because the consequence of such a switch is that the rule will no
longer be the ―logical outgrowth‖ of the proposed rule,232 thus mandating the
commencement of a new rulemaking process. It is therefore not surprising that regulators
have not been successful in creating a more of an iterative process of mutual information
sharing and priority identification with the general public.233
dynamics that systematically, if not necessarily intentionally, silence tenant voices). Gerald Torres
describes the central importance of narratives, and emphasizes that mistranslation between different
narrative frames can hinder consideration of particular viewpoints. Gerald Torres, Translation and Stories,
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Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 856, 893-900 (2007).
233
This conception of how risk communication occurs is intended to avoid the ―science as
propaganda‖ hazard about which Paul Feyerabend has written, while still leaving space for regulatory
decisionmaking that values technical expertise. See PAUL FEYERABEND, SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY 73–76
(1978); Cynthia Hardy, Nelson Phillips, and Tom Lawrence, Distinguishing Trust and Power in
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While the general public has had little opportunity to engage in reflexive
rulemaking with agencies, regulators have had more success in creating these kinds of
processes with regulated industry.234 When problems are ill-defined and possible
alternatives are obscure and unknown, industry has been viewed as best positioned to
contribute valuable information that will make better and more informed decisions
possible. 235 An overly cozy relationship between regulators and regulatees can, and has,
sometimes reduced these processes to mere paper pushing exercises. 236 The most
extreme result has been the tendency in some agencies simply to adopt industry
consensus standards as the official regulatory standards.237 Such an approach does a
disservice to the public both substantively and procedurally. On a substantive basis, not
only do industry standards fail to push the development of new technology in order to
achieve for better environmental performance, they rarely even reflect the best practices
currently available across the industry.238 As the National Commission on the BP
Interorganizational Relations: Forms and Facades of Trust 69-72, in TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN
ORGANIZATIONS (1998)(arguing that trust rests on reciprocal communication and does not involve
communication undertaken to sustain asymmetric power relationships).
234
The public uproar over the secrecy surrounding the Cheney Energy Task Force underscores how
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legitimacy. See e.g. Michael Abramowitz & Steven Mufson, Papers Detail Industry Role in Cheney’s
Energy Report, WASHINGTON POST (July 18, 2007) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/17/AR2007071701987.html?nav=rss_politics; Don Van Natta, Jr., Agency
Files Suit for Cheney Papers on Energy Policy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/23/business/23ENER.html?pagewanted=3. For a full description of the
two lawsuits over this incident, see Sourcewatch, Cheney Energy Task Force,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Cheney_Energy_Task_Force.
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industry—dependent on it for technical expertise.)
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Plans, NPR (June 15, 2010) http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/06/15/127863551/oil-execsgrilled-for-identical-emergency-plans-walruses-and-all; Mike Soragham, Industry Claims of ―Proven‖
Technology Went Unchallenged at MMS http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2010/06/02/1 (pointing
out that many companies engaged in deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico submitted identical spill
response plans.)
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practices developed by the American Petroleum Institute (an industry lobbying group.) See e.g. Les
Blumenthal and Erica Bolstad, U.S. Agency Let Industry Write Offshore Drilling Rules, McClatchy
Washington Bureau (May 10, 2010) available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/10/93859/usagency-lets-oil-industry-write.html. The actual number is 148. See Standards Incorporated by Reference
Database, http://standards.gov.
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In the context of offshore drilling, the Coast Guard warned of this problem in 2002. Writing about
spill response technologies, the Coast Guard warned that improved technologies ―are not generally
available and without requirements in place to require use of new response technologies, they will not be
developed and deployed adequately.‖ United States Coast Guard, 2002 Spill of National Significance After
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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill recently noted, consensus standards are too often lowestcommon denominator standards.239 As a procedural matter, API‘s procedures for
developing standards fall far short of existing federal standards,240 which are in turn,
inadequate to ensure full transparency and participation.
Further contributing to an unbalanced relationship between regulators, regulated
communities and beneficiaries of regulation has been the way that the procedures
enshrined in administrative decisionmaking welcome the public into an expert discourse.
Because of the highly technical nature of many rulemakings, the opportunity to
participate is effective only for those able to translate their concerns into language that
resonates within that discourse.
Human rights norms might help domestic regulators move beyond a minimalist
conception of transparency as public access to government information, and broaden
reflexive rulemaking beyond regulated industries. A robust conception of transparency
must grapple not only with access to government information but also with the equally
significant issues of how and whether information is communicated in a fashion that fully
enables public participation,241 and who bears the costs associated with transparency.
These latter questions are particularly important in the global warming context because,
given the levels of uncertainty, the perceived legitimacy of any regulatory decision will
be tied directly to the level of trust the public rests in the decisionmaker. Meeting this
obligation more fully might sometimes entail simplifying and clarifying information to
make it more accessible. At other times, when information is simply too technical to be
accessible to lay readers and the wider community, fulfilling this oblifation might mean
providing the resources for interested groups to hire independent experts able to represent
their interests in this process.242 A decade ago, EPA‘s Science Advisory Board concluded
that when properly structured, the kind of enhanced participation that human rights law
contemplates can result in high-quality scientific decisions.243
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Report to the President:
Deepwater Horizon: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 217 (Jan. 11, 2011)
https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdf_final/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf
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affected communities or environmental groups.
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(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (providing opinion on democratic process).
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3. Prior Informed Consent
Along the same lines, embracing rigorous prior informed consent procedures
might be a way to address the significant perceptual disconnect that often exists between
those making regulatory decisions and those affected by the decisions. In particular,
there is often a profound distrust between the regulators and the intended beneficiaries of
human health and environmental regulation. There is at least the perception that the
regulators share the world views, interests and values of the regulated parties, rather than
those of the regulation‘s intended beneficiaries. The so-called revolving door between
industry and government is emblematic of this problem. Those selected to head
regulatory agencies often come from the industries they regulate, and then return to those
industries after leaving the government. For example, President Bush appointed Philip
A. Cooney of the American Petroleum Institute as chief of staff of the White House
Council on Environmental Quality. After leaving that post after it was discovered that he
had edited scientific reports in order to downplay evidence of climate change, Mr.
Cooney went to work for Exxon Mobil. Similarly, when David Lauriski became head of
the Mine Safety and Health Administration, he promptly acted on a petition to water
down worker protection regulations—a petition submitted by his former employer
Energy West Mining Company. Upon leaving the government, Lauriski went to work for
John T. Boyd Co., a mining consultancy. 244 Other examples abound.245
One of the major criticisms leveled at the Mineral and Mining Service (MMS),
even before the BP oil spill, was that of a revolving door between industry and the
agency.246 A human rights-based approach to environmental regulation might have
reshaped the regulatory prelude and response to the most significant United States
environmental disaster—the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The NEPA requirement
that the agency prepare an EIS before making a decision about leasing already serves a
number of purposes related to those captured by emerging international environmental
norms. First, an EIS promotes transparency, by requiring the government to identify
proposed actions and to solicit comments thereon. Second, an EIS promotes participation
by allowing all interested to comment.
However, the EIS requirement would be enhanced if it were interpreted in concert
with the emerging international environmental norm of prior informed consent and the
right to environmental information. These norms embody a different and more robust
concept of public participation than currently seen in United States law. They require the
government to make this right concrete by actively soliciting participation from those
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who might otherwise not participate in the decisionmaking process. 247 If NEPA were
interpreted along those lines, voices that typically do not get attention before postdecisionmaking litigation, if indeed they are heard at all, would become an integral part
of shaping the EIS inquiry itself. As a result, the government would hear a more diverse
array of voices when they could do more good—when the government is deciding the
scope of activity to investigate, rather than at a later litigation phase challenging a
decision that is already a fait accompli. In particular, embrace of the human rights
concept of prior informed consent would give affected communities the sense that they
had some control over their destiny.
Overall, a human rights framing could help agencies facilitate wide-spread public
participation, including those currently excluded, de facto if not de jure. Such a result
would enhance the democratic legitimacy of regulatory decisionmaking under NEPA,
and would also improve the quality of the actual decisions themselves. 248 This kind of
participatory process also supplies the requisite ―world in common‖ that sociological
research tells us is necessary for trust.249 Because so much of the human rights discourse
surrounding environmental rights focuses on participation and access to information, the
NEPA EIS process250 is a place where learning from human rights norms might enrich
the domestic regulatory process.
Because it would give typically under-represented groups a clearly-defined role in the
conduct of an environmental assessment, the human-rights enhanced EIS process
described above would also help promote an additional emerging international norm—
intergenerational equity. Particularly where irreversible changes are contemplated,
247
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intergenerational equity would put a thumb on the scale for precaution—for sustainably
managing and preserving rather than overexploiting resources. EPA has already begun to
embrace this concept, rejecting a narrow economic vision of social welfare that denies the
obligation of intergenerational equity either because we cannot know future preferences
or because future generations are presumed to be wealthier and therefore more able to
absorb costs that present generations pass on to them.251
In its December 2009 Endangerment Finding, EPA explicitly and repeatedly found
that greenhouse gas emissions threatened the public health, and the public welfare of
current and future generations.252 EPA defended its consideration of future harms and
future generations as appropriate given the time scale of expected effects. 253 In doing so,
the agency harkened back to the earliest days of the Clean Air Act and to the judicial
finding that the statute is precautionary in nature.254 This judicial finding built on the
Congressional legislative history indicating that the Clean Air Act was intended to
prevent harm before it occurred and was thus precautionary rather than reactive.
This decision to include harms to future generations within the realm of issues to be
considered in assessing endangerment is clearly not a wholesale endorsement of the
internationally-developing notion of intergenerational equity. Nor is it at all comparable
to the Philippine Supreme Court‘s endorsement of the rights of future generations in
Oposa. It is however, a beginning. In making this finding, EPA has opened a dialogue
that may lead to genuine regulatory consideration of questions of intergenerational
equity. In doing so, EPA acted solidly within the spirit of NEPA which states:
it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal government to use all
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of
national policy, to [ensure] . . . that the Nation may . . . fulfill the
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations.255
Similarly, the National Park Service Act specifically identifies the preservation of
national parks and monuments for future generations as the fundamental purpose for
which the Park Service was founded.256 In addition, the Coastal Zone Management
251
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Act,257 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act258 also identify protecting future generations as
part of their statutory purpose.
Throughout its endangerment finding, EPA relied extensively on the work of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, particularly its 2007 Report.259 This resort
to the accumulated wisdom of an internationally-constituted (albeit intergovernmental)
organization may signal a broader willingness to engage with and draw on international
sources. Thus, the twin decisions to predicate the Endangerment Finding in part on harms
to future generations, and in part on the scientific work compiled by the IPCC may
indicate a new path for regulatory decisionmaking in the climate change context.
V.

CONCLUDING NOTE

What makes environmental regulation so difficult is not necessarily a lack of
commitment to environmental goods, but rather competing visions of how to balance
between these goods and other social priorities. Too often environmental concerns are
pitted against powerful economic interests in a zero sum fashion. For example, despite
the worst environmental disaster in United States history, unabashed and explicit
concerns for the continued viability of the deepwater drilling industry animated the
Hornbeck decision striking down the Department of Interior‘s decision to impose a 60
day deepwater drilling moratorium. 260 This moratorium was explicitly for the purposes of
allowing the agency to learn from the disaster about the needed safety and environmental
changes that were necessary to protect the public.
Because the regulatory prelude to the BP oil spill was also poorly managed,261 with
inaccurate and incomplete NEPA documents rubber-stamped by the agency, and safety
inspections allegedly completed by the company itself, it also raises the question of
whether engagement with environmental human rights norms might have restrained the
regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations... by such
means and measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and
reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life
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unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.‖ 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
257
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government and encouraged it to more fully exercise the regulatory powers it already
possessed.
When a government does not care about the environment and bends existing law to
avoid giving it force, can human right norms make a difference? I think the answer is a
resounding yes. A government bent on violating human rights can certainly do so. But,
the existence of a vibrant culture of human rights means that it can no longer do so with
impunity. If existing United States environmental regulatory processes had been imbued
with more of a human rights sensibility it would have been much more difficult to play
fast and loose with environmental requirements in the Gulf of Mexico. Because human
rights discourse offers a well-institutionalized international regime,262 it offers an
attractive vantage point from which to begin the culture shift that will make scenarios like
the BP oil spill less likely.
That said, the relationship between international law and domestic law is a fraught
question in the United States. Several Supreme Court justices263 and numerous elected
representatives are on record for the proposition that resort to international law to
understand United States law, particularly constitutional law, is inappropriate. In 2002,
for example, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas admonished his fellow justices not
to "impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."264
The recent healthcare debate underscored the political tensions of looking outside our
borders for regulatory models.265 This isolationist stance finds support in a popularly-held
Panglossian vision of United States law as the best, truest and fairest of possible legal
262

Regimes are typically defined as the principles, rules, norms and decisionmaking procedures around
which expectations converge. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 Int‘l Org. 185 (1982); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A
Regime Analysis, 40 Int‘l Org. 599, 602 (1986)(offering a slightly narrower definition of regimes as the
norms and decisionmaking processes accepted by international actors to regulate an issue area.)
263
Justice Scalia in particular has expressed hostility to the use of foreign law. For example, in 2004,
Justice Scalia told the American Society of International Law that "It is my view that modern foreign legal
material can never be relevant to any interpretation of, that is to say, to the meaning of the U.S.
Constitution.‖ Scalia Skeptical about International Law in US Courts, Marin Independent Journal (April 4,
2004). available at: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1110916/posts. Justice O‘Connor by
contrast, stated that ―conclusions reached by other countries and the international community, although not
formally binding on our decisions, should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.‖
Remarks of Sandra Day O‘Connor, at the Southern Center for International Law (Oct. 28, 2003) available
at http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_transcript.pdf. She viewed this interchange, which she called
―transjudicialism‖ as enriching United States law. Id.
264
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n. * (Oct. 21, 2002).
265
The so-called ―tea party‖ movement grew from opposition to congressional attempts to reform
health care in the United States. Much of the rhetoric fueling this opposition was the accusation that health
reform proposals were too influenced by approaches to health care in countries other than the United States.
For a typical example of this rhetoric, see Intolerable Acts and Tea Parties (March 22, 2010) at
http://fixhealthcarepolicy.com/tag/tea-party/. Similarly, some prominent Republican political leaders have
accused the administration of ―want[ing] to turn us into France.‖ See e.g. Evan Morris Santoro, McConnell,
Cantor and Paul Warn GOPers at KY Breakfast: Democrats Will Destroy America, Talking Points Memo
(Aug. 7, 2010) http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/08/paul-mcconnell-and-paul-warn-gopers-at-kybreakfast.php (quoting McConnell as saying ―We decided when they decided they were going to turn us
into France, we were going to say no.") see also McConnell: Dems will turn us into France, WASHINGTON
TIMES (May 12, 2008) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/may/12/mcconnell-dems-will-turn-usinto-france/ . Indeed a search for the phrase ―turn us into France‖ turned up more than 30,000 results
accusing either President Obama or the Democrats of subverting American democracy.

51
systems. The logical corollary of this belief is a disinclination to look elsewhere for
guidance—if what exists here is already the ―best of all possible worlds‖ any resort to
foreign or international law will degrade rather than enhance domestic legal processes.
This nativist approach is dead wrong, both factually untrue (the United States has an
impressive legal system to be sure, but it has many structural flaws in urgent need of
remedy) and analytically unproductive. Time is too short, and the problems we face are
too grave to allow parochial boosterism to continue to keep valuable tools and
information out of the hands of those sworn to protect the public from harm. We must be
willing to both learn from the successes (and failures) of others, and allow them to learn
from us in a similar fashion. Looking to international human rights law for models and
ideas will improve domestic regulation both by encouraging regulators to make giving
real content to environmental statutes a central part of their mission, and by offering them
tools by which to do this.
To say this is not to deny that giving content to those rights remains an enormous
challenge. Despite an impressive body of normative law, the on-the-ground, real world
success in implementing the human rights norms that international law articulates is too
often measured in inches. Progress is slow, even as environmental threats continue to
mount. The identical, error-riddled spill prevention plans that the Mineral and Mining
Service rubberstamped for BP and other drillers in the Gulf of Mexico provides a stark
reminder that the laws are only as good as those charged with enforcing them. Too often
regulators have failed to implement key environmental laws like NEPA, and enforcement
has been in half-measures. While the regulators sleep, environmental degradation and
pollution continues largely unchecked.266
Regulators will need to sharpen their tools, and to wield them with vigor as they
respond to climate change.267 If we do not take effective actions, and soon,268 the
aggregate consequences of human activity may threaten the very existence of life on
earth.269 For example, Dr. James E. Hansen, Director of the NASA Goddard Institute for
Space Studies, and NASA‘s top climate scientist, has stated: ―In my opinion there is no
significant doubt (probability > 99%) that . . . additional global warming of 2 degrees
Celsius would push the earth beyond the tipping point and cause dramatic climate
impacts including eventual sea level rise of at least several meters, extermination of a
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substantial fraction of the animal and plant species on the planet, and major regional
climate disruptions.‖270
In the face of this impending catastrophe, the legal project seems stymied—with the
international community unable even to negotiate an international successor agreement to
the Kyoto Protocol,271 and the United States Senate abandoning attempts to pass climate
change legislation.272 EPA is currently under siege273 for its attempt to step into the
breach and to use its legal mandate under the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon dioxide,274
thereby making some small regulatory step toward preserving and protecting the earth‘s
ecosystems. It is clear that their work would be further improved by invocation of human
rights norms to inform these existing environmental decisionmaking processes. It is not
clear, however, that such an invocation would support rather than undermine the agency‘s
political position. It would indeed be unfortunate were parochial conceptions of law to
keep useful tools out of the hands of regulators amidst a growing sense of environmental
crisis. Yet, the relationship between the legislature and regulators exercising delegated
authority means that this vulnerability is an inherent aspect of choosing to focus on
regulators as a locus of ―authoritative decision.‖ While there is much promise to pursuing
that choice, the promise comes with short-term perils.
Yet over time, I am convinced that reasonable minds will prevail, and the obvious
utility of looking to international human rights to improve domestic environmental
regulation will silence, if not convert, the nay-sayers. The complex and ambiguous
nature of the environmental challenges we face demands no less. Successfully responding
to these challenges requires a dynamic balancing process capable of accounting for rapid
technological change amidst conflicting national imperatives. Using human rights norms
to interpret existing statutory rights and regulatory responsibilities can help build a more
vibrant and effective environmental regulatory regime, and we cannot afford not to take
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advantage of that possibility.

